Jurisdiction and Double Jeopardy: Supreme Court Ruling on Appeal of Acquittal
Date: August 31, 2022
Ponente: Gaerlan, J.
- Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari for lack of jurisdiction over Percy.
- Whether the petition for certiorari was filed with the authority or conformity of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
- Rule 46, Section 4 of the Rules of Court (jurisdiction over the person of respondent)
- Rule 4, Section 3 of the Rules of Court (proof of service of petition)
- Jurisprudence on voluntary appearance and submission to jurisdiction
- Volenti non fit injuria: Voluntary submission to jurisdiction is equivalent to service.
- Res judicata: A judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable.
- Jurisdiction over the person of a respondent can be acquired through voluntary submission.
- A petition for certiorari filed without the authority or conformity of the OSG cannot be given due course.
- An acquittal in a criminal case is final and unappealable, except in cases where the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case. Being a matter of substantive law, it pertains to the right of the court to act in a case. In order for the court or an adjudicative body to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine the general class to which the proceedings in question belong. Conferred by the Constitution or given by law and in the manner prescribed by law, jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint, including the character of the reliefs prayed for.
On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person or the parties, or jurisdiction in personam, refers to the power of the court to render a personal judgment or to subject the parties in a particular action to the judgment and other rulings rendered in the action. It is the power of the court to make decisions that are binding on persons. It is an element of due process that is essential in all actions, civil as well as criminal, except in actions in rem or quasi in rem.
The instant case involves the determination of whether the CA validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of Percy.
In original cases filed before the CA, such as the subject petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court that Stanley filed a quo, the appellate court acquires jurisdiction over the person of a respondent by serving upon him or her an order or resolution indicating its initial action on the said petition. Rule 46, Section 4 so states:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction over the person of respondent, how acquired. - The court shall acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent by the service on him of its order or resolution indicating its initial action on the petition or by his voluntary submission to such jurisdiction.
In order for the CA to be able to effect the said order or resolution upon the person of a respondent to a petition, it is incumbent upon a petitioner to inform the CA of said respondent's complete address. This is accomplished by furnishing the CA with a proof of service of the petition on the respondent concerned, as provided by Rule 4, Section 3.
Nevertheless, it bears stressing that jurisdiction over the person of a defendant or respondent, as the case may be, is also acquired through his or her voluntary appearance in court and submission to its authority. There is voluntary appearance when a party, without directly assailing the court's lack of jurisdiction, seeks affirmative relief from the court.
In the instant case, Percy voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the CA when he filed a Comment to Petition dated March 18, 2019 praying for the outright dismissal of Stanley's petition for certiorari on the sole ground that it was not filed with the authority or conformity of the OSG. His voluntary appearance is equivalent to service.
Prescinding from the foregoing, one may readily conclude that the CA was too hasty in dismissing Stanley's petition for certiorari and, as a result, it is incumbent upon this Court to remand the case to the CA and direct the appellate court to give due course thereto. However, because this Court has the solemn duty to protect the Constitution and the constitutional rights of individuals, particularly Percy's, We cannot do so.
II.
Even if the Court were to remand the instant case to the CA, the eventual outcome will be the same. It will be dismissed because (1) it was filed without the conformity or authority of the OSG; and (2) it violates Percy's right against double jeopardy.
II. A.
In the appeal of criminal cases before the CA or the Supreme Court, the authority to represent the People is vested solely in the Solicitor General. That is, only the OSG may bring or defend actions in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal proceedings before the Supreme Court and the CA. Stanley acknowledges this much in his Reply.
Nevertheless, in a bid to circumvent the foregoing rule, Stanley backpedaled and asserted that he was actually seeking to protect the rights of the Estate of Williams insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned.
We reject Stanley's lame excuse.
A reading of Stanley's Petition for Certiorari with the CA readily shows that not a single sentence in the said pleading discusses the civil aspect of the criminal cases filed against Percy. The entirety of said petition uniformly contends that the trial court erred in its evaluation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution when it granted Percy's demurrer to evidence. Every single paragraph limited itself to the discussion of the elements of the crime of carnapping and why the trial court erred in acquitting Percy.
At the risk of being repetitious, it is worth noting, at this juncture, that the assignment of error in Stanley's petition for certiorari before the CA made one solitary contention, that: "THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT GRANTED THE ACCUSED'S DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED AND DESPITE ALL AVAILABLE JURISPRUDENTIAL PRECEDENTS."
It is crystal clear that Stanley was seeking to appeal an acquittal in a criminal case despite knowing all along that he had neither the right nor the authority to do so.
In any event, granting arguendo that Stanley was truthfully questioning the civil aspect of the suject criminal cases, the fact remains that he instituted his petition for certiorari before the CA without first filing a motion for reconsideration with the RTC.
The rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari. Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.
While this rule admits of exceptions, none of which is obtaining in this case. Stanley cannot arrogate to himself the determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary or not.
II. B.
Settled is the principle that an order granting a demurrer to evidence is a judgment on the merits and is tantamount to an acquittal. We adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine which edifies the principle that a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. Any attempt to overturn an acquittal runs afoul of an accused's right against double jeopardy as provided in Section 21, Article III of the Constitution.
In People v. Sandiganbayan, We explained:
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after the prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there. (Citations omitted)
Case law provides only one exception to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, i.e., when the trial court has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham, thus, rendering the assailed judgment void.
Here, records show that the prosecution completed the presentation of all its documentary and testimonial evidence during the trial without a hitch. It was also able to make a formal offer of evidence. The trial was not a sham. The aforementioned exception, therefore, does not apply in this case. Directing the CA to give due course to Stanley's petition for certiorari would be tantamount to placing Percy twice in jeopardy for criminal offenses that he had already been acquitted from.
All told, We find that the CA erred in concluding that it was not able to acquire jurisdiction over the person of Percy. Nonetheless, because it is the mandate of the Court to put primacy on constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty, this Court cannot remand the case to the CA for further proceedings because Stanley had no authority to file the said petition in the first place; and, more importantly, because doing so would violate Percy's right against double jeopardy.
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