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• Whether the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal and administrative charges against private respondent.

• Whether the private respondent's actions in withholding the remittance of deductions constituted a crime under Section 3(e) and (f) of R.A. No. 3019, and Article 286 of the RPC.

• The Office of the Ombudsman has wide latitude in the exercise of its investigative and prosecutorial powers.

• The determination of probable cause is a function that belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman.

• Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.

• The Court will not interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of its power unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion.

NOTE:

At the outset, the Court first must note that public respondent's dismissal of the administrative charges against private respondent vis-à-vis Case No. OMB-P-A-13-0310 has already attained finality. This is because petitioners cannot seek direct recourse from the Court relative to public respondent's said dismissal, which is only applicable to the criminal aspect of public respondent's rulings. The Court had already clarified in Joson v. Office of the Ombudsman that the proper remedy to assail the complete exoneration or absolution of a respondent in an administrative case decided by the Ombudsman is to file an original petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. Thus, the Court lacks jurisdiction to touch upon the administrative aspect of public respondent's rulings here.

With regard to the criminal aspect of public respondent's rulings vis-à-vis Case No. OMB-P-C-13-0269, the Court is reminded of its fairly recent ruling in Yatco v. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, which reiterated the jurisprudential lineage summed up in Gatchalian v. Office of the Ombudsman relative to the Court's own and proper jurisdiction over original petitions for certiorari to assail the Ombudsman's rulings in criminal cases involving findings of probable cause (or lack thereof). The Court also clarified in the remedies available to a party wishing to question a consolidated ruling of the Ombudsman (i.e., which disposed of both criminal and administrative aspects of a case), viz.:

As consolidation is a matter for the court to determine post-filing, it does not affect the nature of the procedural recourse taken by the aggrieved party. Here, when the Ombudsman consolidated the criminal and administrative charges against respondents, it deemed it proper to resolve both criminal and administrative aspects in one Joint Resolution because the charges involved common questions of fact or law. Ordinarily, administrative and criminal charges filed before the Ombudsman would usually pertain to one incident involving the same set of facts and parties, from which both criminal and administrative liabilities may stem. This gives rise to their consolidation. However, after the Ombudsman renders its consolidated ruling, the aggrieved party is then required to take the appropriate procedural remedies to separately assail the administrative and criminal components of the same. Clearly, a Rule 65 certiorari petition (which is the proper remedy to assail the criminal aspect of the Ombudsman ruling; or the administrative aspect of an unappealable Ombudsman ruling) is clearly different from a Rule 43 appeal (which is the proper remedy to assail the administrative aspect of an appealable ruling).

Thus, the Court only has jurisdiction over the instant Petition vis-à-vis its criminal aspect. In other words, the Court now presently considers the sole issue proper, i.e., whether or not Public Respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in finding no probable cause to charge private respondent for violation of Sections 3(e) and 3(f) of R.A. No. 3019, as well as Article 286 of the RPC.

The Court's jurisdiction to review and check any grave abuse of discretion relative to the prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman is circumscribed by jurisprudential precedent that affirms constitutional and legislative fiat. In Casing v. Ombudsman, the Court expounded thus:

The Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with wide latitude, in the exercise of its investigatory and prosecutory powers, to pass upon criminal complaints involving public officials and employees. Specifically, the determination of whether probable cause exists is a function that belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman. Whether a criminal case, given its attendant facts and circumstances, should be filed or not is basically its call.

As a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman's exercise of its investigative and prosecutorial powers, and respects the initiative and independence inherent in the Office of the Ombudsman which, "beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of the public service." While the Ombudsman's findings as to whether probable cause exists are generally not reviewable by this Court, where there is an allegation of grave abuse of discretion, the Ombudsman's act cannot escape judicial scrutiny under the Court's own constitutional power and duty "to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."

Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner — which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law — in order to exceptionally warrant judicial intervention. (Citations omitted)

Verily, the Court must now determine if public respondent rendered its rulings in gross contradiction to established law and jurisprudence.

In Tupaz v. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, restated the elements of a violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act: "(1) the offender is a public officer; (2) the act was done in the discharge of the public officer's official, administrative or judicial functions; (3) the act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and (4) the public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference." From the facts as established in the proceedings below before public respondent, the Court finds both the third and fourth element severely lacking.

It is an established fact that private respondent indeed ordered the stoppage of payment of remittances due BFPMBAI due to the latter's election controversy and resulting two sets of trustees. And on its face, private respondent's authority to do so seems to be suspect. Even the President's own power with regard to the same under Book VI, Chapter 5, Section 38 of Executive Order No. 292 (s. 1987), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, is statutorily circumscribed, viz:

SECTION 38. Suspension of Expenditure of Appropriations. – Except as otherwise provided in the General Appropriations Act and whenever in his judgment the public interest so requires, the President, upon notice to the head of office concerned, is authorized to suspend or otherwise stop further expenditure of funds allotted for any agency, or any other expenditure authorized in the General Appropriations Act, except for [personnel] services appropriations used for permanent officials and employees. (Underscoring supplied)

Given that remittances to associations such as BFP-MBAI are authorized deductions under any General Appropriations Act that are chargeable to appropriations for personnel services, private respondent seems to have lacked the proper authority to issue his Memorandum ordering the said stoppage. Moreover, relative to his filing of the Complaint-in-Interpleader, said case would have necessitated the consignation of the amounts corresponding to the remittances that should have been released to BFPMBAI, in accordance with Articles 1256 and 1258 of R.A. No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines. But Private Respondent really had no right of disposal over the said funds after they were reverted to the Bureau of the Treasury. This is because Book VI, Chapter 4, Section 28 of the Administrative Code of 1987 requires subsequent legislative enactment for the expenditure of unexpended balances of appropriations that have been reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the General Fund—which is managed by the Bureau of the Treasury.

Despite the foregoing, the Court fails to see any manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence on the part of private respondent, as well as any undue injury or unwarranted benefits here. Private respondent may have been misguided or in ignorance of the finer points of the law regarding the appropriation and expenditure of public funds, but his actions belie his actual intent to protect the interests of both BFP and BFPMBAI. In ordering the stoppage of payment of the remittances, Private respondent was motivated by his assessment that the remittances would in all likelihood be the subject of mishandling due to the conflicting sets of trustees. This is also the motivation behind his filing of the Complaint-in-Interpleader, despite the seeming impossibility of consigning the remittance amounts. And to ensure that BFPMBAI members would not be unduly burdened, private respondent met with insurance providers such as Fortune Life in order to work out the uninterrupted processing of BFPMBAI members' insurance claims during the pendency of the interpleader case.

It is true and obvious that private respondent belongs to the rival camp vis-à-vis Petitioners and their fellow complainants below, and one can easily surmise as to the camps' likely animosity towards each other. Absent any concrete proof of private respondent's manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence relative to his actions on the remittances, one cannot adduce anything that points to private respondent's criminal intent. As the Court stated in Suba v. Sandiganbayan, "[s]ince bad faith entails deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or to cause damage, it must be shown that the accused was spurred by corrupt motive." Elucidating further,

Jurisprudence instructs that bad faith referred to under Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence but of having a palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do some moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive, or ill will. It connotes a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. It is a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will and partakes of the nature of fraud.

In People v. Bacaltos, we explained that bad faith per se is not enough for one to be held criminally liable for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Bad faith must be evident and must partake the nature of fraud. That is, it is a manifest[ly] deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or to cause damage. (Citations omitted)

Moreover, there appears to be nothing in the record that crucially points to how petitioners, their fellow complainants below, BFPMBAI, or any of the latter's members were subjected to any undue injury here. Petitioners' bare allegations that BFPMBAI was put on the verge of financial collapse lack any substantial evidence, and assertion that BFPMBAI's members were already entitled to the deductions to be remitted is belied by the very case they invoke: the Court in Tiro v. Hontanosas specifically ruled that "[t]he salary check of a government officer or employee such as a teacher does not belong to him before it is physically delivered to him. Until that time the check belongs to the government. Accordingly, before there is actual delivery of the check, the payee has no power over it; he cannot assign it without the consent of the Government." Since BFP withheld the payment of the remittances—which actually never reached the Land Bank accounts of BFPMBAI members, contrary to what petitioners assert—the said amounts were not yet their personal property, and they were thus without any injury as yet.

Neither is there any showing here that private respondents accorded any unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference to any party, much less himself. As is clear from the facts, all the unremitted remittances reverted back to the control and disposition of the Bureau of the Treasury. Petitioners did not even allege that private respondent misappropriated or pilfered the said amounts. No disadvantage or preference is also present here, since there is an extant interpleader case that will determine in the first instance which set of BFPMBAI trustees will be entitled to administer and receive the remittances.

Going now to the second criminal charge, Lacap v. Sandiganbayan restates the elements of a violation of Section 3(f) of R.A. No. 3019, viz: "

(1) The offender is a public officer;

(2) The said officer has neglected or has refused to act without sufficient justification after due demand or request has been made on him;

(3) Reasonable time has elapsed from such demand or request without the public officer having acted on the matter pending before him; and

(4) Such failure to so act is for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage in favor of an interested party, or discriminating against another." 

Again, the Court finds that there is no sufficient evidence on record to hold private respondent to account for such a charge.

From the facts, it is clear that the fourth element of the supposed crime is lacking. Petitioners and their fellow complainants below submitted bare allegations before public respondent that private respondent held the remittances "hostage" in return for either of the following: the ousting of the entire set of BFPMBAI trustees composed of petitioners and their fellow complainants, the recognition of Private Respondent as the legitimate chairperson of the BFPMBAI Board of Trustees, or even the issuance of BFPMBAI Board of Trustees' Resolution No. 13-04 (which effectively gave private respondent and his camp a trustee seat). But these are just that: bare allegations unsubstantiated by any evidence of private respondent's alleged actions that either compelled, intimidated, or blackmailed Petitioners and their fellow Complainants. Petitioners did not even present a transcript or record of the conversations they and their fellow complainants below had with private respondent immediately after the stoppage of payment. Again, and similar to the charge of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, there is no evidence on record pointing to any pecuniary or material benefit that private respondent received on account of his order to stop the payment of the remittances. Mere inferences and conjectures as to the one-upmanship between the two electoral camps will not suffice for purposes of finding probable cause here.

As to the charge against private respondent for violation of Article 286 of the RPC, Sy v. Secretary of Justice, outlines the elements of the crime of Grave Coercion, viz.: "

1) that a person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his will, be it right or wrong;

2) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, threats or intimidation; and

3) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so, or in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right." 

Again, there is no evidence on record of any violence, threats, or intimidation on the part of private respondent save for their bare and unsubstantiated allegations. Even BFPMBAI Board of Trustees' Resolution No. 13-04 has no extrinsic reference to any concrete action on the part of private respondent's supposed demands for its issuance. Absent this, the criminal charge for grave coercion against private respondent—as outlined in the Complaint—Affidavit by mere imputation-breeds in the mind no probable cause for his indictment.

All in all, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent due to the sheer absence of any evidence on record that would warrant a finding of probable cause to indict private respondent for the aforementioned criminal offenses. Petitioners carried the burden to prove that public respondent's findings were tainted with capricious, whimsical, or even arbitrary jurisdictional error, but they failed to discharge said burden. As the Court ruled in Arroyo v. Sandiganbayan, "[m]ere disagreement with the Ombudsman's findings is not enough reason to constitute grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner must show that the preliminary investigation was conducted in such a way that amounted to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law." With no exceptional showing of such alleged grave abuse of discretion here, the Court reverts to its policy of non-interference and respect vis-à-vis public respondent's executive power to determine the existence of probable cause in preliminary investigations involving public officials. Thus, public respondent's rulings relative to the dismissal of the criminal charges against private respondent must stand and remain unassailed.

On a penultimate note relative to private respondent's Complaint-in-Interpleader, the Court refrains from passing any judgment thereon due to the pendency of proceedings before RTC-Quezon City (Branch 80)—the termination or finality of which has not been manifested before the Court. The Court, thus, cannot make a ruling as to whether or not private respondent was already barred from filing the same due to his supposed failure to question the election controversy through an intra-corporate controversy as insisted by petitioners. But said issue is actually irrelevant to the present petition, since the Court merely focuses on the intent behind private respondent's filing of the said Complaint-in-Interpleader vis-à-vis the criminal aspect of the charges against him. As stated above, the Court finds that public respondent did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal aspect of the said charges, since its rulings do not deviate from standing law and jurisprudence.

Lastly, as to the matter of petitioners' belated allegation that former Deputy Ombudsman Ramos had a hand in public respondent's resolution of the Complaint-Affidavit, the Court takes a stern view against such an unsubstantiated charge. While it is of judicial notice that he was appointed to be Deputy Ombudsman on May 6, 2014, i.e., just over a month before public respondent promulgated its Joint Resolution, Deputy Ombudsman Ramos' name appears nowhere in the record—save for in Petitioner's Reply. He is not a signatory to both the Joint Resolution and Joint Order of Public Respondent vis-à-vis the case, and even if he was contracted as a financial consultant of BFP during the height of controversy (i.e., on September 2, 2013 as stated in his Service Agreement, there is again no concrete proof on record of his alleged influence and bias that resulted in the dismissal of the Complaint-Affidavit (such as any official communications or papers signed or authored by former Deputy Ombudsman Ramos in his capacity as a BFP financial consultant). The Court sees fit to warn petitioners and their counsel against putting forth such unverified assertions in pleadings before any tribunal in the future.

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