Remedies of a landowner when his/her property is taken for public use

The power of eminent domain is one of the three inherent powers of the Government by which the State interferes with the people's property rights. It is the ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate, not only the public but the private property of all citizens within the territorial sovereignty, to public purpose. Though it exists independently of the Constitution, it is limited by the constitutional fiat that, "[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."

Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the true measure of which is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. To be "just," the compensation must not only be for the correct amount but it must be made within a reasonable time from the taking of the property.

Consequently, it is well-settled that where private property is taken by the Government for public use without first acquiring title thereto through expropriation or negotiated sale, the owner's action to recover the land or its value is imprescriptible. However, the remedy of recovery of possession is not absolute, this is available only when the return of the property is feasible. When no longer feasible or convenient, the aggrieved owner is left with no choice but to demand payment for the land taken.

Here, respondent has been in possession of the property since 1954. Sometime in 1959, the City Hall of Naga was erected thereon, which up to this date remains in the site, along with other national government offices. Respondent neither expropriated nor purchased the property through negotiated sale, hence petitioners were not paid the value thereof. Be that as it may, petitioners' action to recover the property is no longer feasible. To order respondent and the other national government offices to vacate the property and deliver possession to petitioners would result to dire consequences. It would hamper the functioning of the local government unit and the delivery of public services to the city's constituents. Indeed, the only remedy left for petitioners is to be paid just compensation.

The question that now arises is, at what point in time should the just compensation be reckoned from? 

Just compensation should be pegged at the time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation

As a general rule, just compensation is based on the price or value of the property at the time the complaint for expropriation was filed. This is because normally the time of taking coincides with the filing of the said complaint.

Notably, Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court reads:

Section 4. Order of expropriation. — If the objections to and the defenses against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the property are overruled, or when no party appears to defend as required by this Rule, the court may issue an order of expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first. (Emphasis supplied)

Nevertheless, there are instances when the taking of private property preceded the filing of the complaint for expropriation. In such cases, the payment of just compensation is reckoned from the date of taking. In Republic v. Vda. de Castellvi, the Court held that there is "taking" for purposes of expropriation when the following elements concur: (1) the expropriator must enter private property; (2) the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him/her of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

Applying the foregoing parameters in this case, I submit that there was no "taking" in 1954 when respondent gained possession of the property as the donee under the Deed of Donation dated August 16, 1954. The third element of taking was missing. Respondent's entrance in 1954 was without intent to expropriate or was not made under warrant or color of legal authority since it believed that it owns the property by virtue of the donation. This is consistent with the Court's ruling in National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals and Macapanton Mangondato (Mangondato).

In Mangondato, the National Power Corporation (NPC) believed that it entered a public land in 1978 so it refused just compensation when the landowners claimed ownership of the lot. The Court held that without the intent to expropriate, just compensation for the value of the property cannot be pegged in 1978 because it does not qualify as "taking" for purposes of expropriation. Instead, just compensation was based on the date of NPC's filing of the complaint for expropriation. The Court explained that:

In this case, the petitioner's [referring to NPC] entrance in 1978 was without intent to expropriate or was not made under warrant or color of legal authority, for it believed the property was public land covered by Proclamation No. 1354. When the private respondent raised his claim of ownership sometime in 1979, the petitioner flatly refused the claim for compensation, nakedly insisted that the property was public land and wrongly justified its possession by alleging it had already paid "financial assistance" to Marawi City in exchange for the rights over the property. Only in 1990, after more than a decade of beneficial use, did the petitioner recognize private respondent's ownership and negotiate for the voluntary purchase of the property. A Deed of Sale with provisional payment and subject to negotiations for the correct price was then executed. Clearly, this is not the intent nor the expropriation contemplated by law. This is a simple attempt at a voluntary purchase and sale. Obviously, the petitioner neglected and/or refused to exercise the power of eminent domain.

Only in 1992, after the private respondent sued to recover possession and petitioner filed its Complaint to expropriate, did petitioner manifest its intention to exercise the power of eminent domain. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners claimed that the donation did not take effect because it was subject to the condition that the construction of the City Hall of Naga would be awarded to City Heights Subdivision (CHS), which was not complied with by respondent. However, I note that it was only in 1959 when the construction of the City Hall was awarded to another contractor. Thus, it could be safely assumed that prior to this circumstance, respondent genuinely believed that the 1954 donation was valid and that it entered the property as its owner.

In 1959, after respondent failed to comply with the condition of the donation, Mayor Monico Imperial (Mayor Imperial) offered to purchase the property from its owners. In effect, he, as representative of respondent, recognized Mariano's and Gimenez's ownership of the property and the invalidity of the donation. By virtue of the voluntary offer to purchase the property, petitioners tolerated respondent's continued possession of the property. On May 14, 1968, Mariano made a follow-up on the proposal made by Mayor Imperial for the purchase of the property. His letter to Eusebio Lopez, Jr. (Lopez, Jr.), the General Manager of CHS, reads:

Please be advised to disregard all my previous letters and instructions to you regarding the donation of the city hall and market sites to the City of Naga. Kindly make immediate representation to the City Mayor and insist on the previous proposal made by Mayor Monico Imperial for the city to buy the land we offered to them.

Considering the lapse of time and until now, no clear actions have been made by the city, I suggest you take whatever appropriate actions on this matter the soonest possible time.

Had Mariano wanted to recover possession of the property and turned his back on the previous proposal for the purchase of the property, he could have categorically instructed Lopez, Jr. to file a case in court or demand the return of the property from respondent. Yet, Mariano's first directive was for Lopez, Jr. to insist on the sale. Mariano was still hoping that respondent would make good on its offer. This is a clear sign of continuous tolerance or implied permission from Mariano for respondent to continue its possession pending the sale.

In Tan v. Republic, the Court refused to recognize the entry of the Public Estates Authority (PEA) into a private property in 1985 as the "taking" contemplated by law because it was made with the permission of the owner. After entry, PEA requested the owner to donate or to sell the land to the government. Negotiations ensued but no agreement was reached. In the interim, the property was sold to a new owner, who asked the PEA for a land swapping arrangement as a form of compensation. Initially, PEA agreed but later withdrew from the deal. In 2003, it filed a complaint for expropriation. The Court held that just compensation should be determined in 2003 because there was no intent to expropriate the land in 1985, to wit:

[W]hen PEA entered petitioner's land in 1985, it was not for the purpose of expropriating it. We stress that after its entry, PEA wrote SADC requesting to donate or sell the land to the government. Indeed, there was no intention on the part of PEA to expropriate the subject property. Why did it ask permission from SADC to enter the property? Thereafter, why did it request SADC to donate or sell the land to the government? It could have simply exercised its power of eminent domain.

x x x x

We have made it clear that there was no taking of the property in 1985 by PEA for purposes of expropriation. As shown by the records, PEA filed with the RTC its petition for expropriation on September 22, 2003. The trial court, therefore, was correct in ordering respondent, through PEA, upon the filing of its complaint for expropriation, to pay petitioner just compensation on the basis of the BIR zonal valuation of the subject property at P20,000.00 per square meter. (Emphasis supplied)

Notably, up to this date or specifically the filing of respondent's Second Motion for Reconsideration, respondent has not filed a case for expropriation of the property. Quite the contrary, petitioners had formally ceased from tolerating respondent's possession of the property when they commenced the ejectment suit against respondent in the Municipal Trial Court of Naga City on February 12, 2004. Considering that petitioners could no longer recover the physical possession of the property because it is not feasible, the Court may convert and/or "continue" the ejectment suit as if it were an action for recovery of just compensation filed by the landowner pursuant to National Transmission Corp. v. Bermuda Development Corp.

Treating the ejectment case as a complaint for expropriation and remanding it to the CA, as suggested by Justice Lazaro-Javier, would expedite the protracted litigation between the parties.

On remand, the proceeding before the CA would partake the nature of an "inverse condemnation." The objective of inverse condemnation is to recover the value of property taken in fact by the government, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency. The action is anchored on Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. That it was the landowner rather than the expropriator who files the suit does not change the fact that the action is based on the State's exercise of its power of eminent domain. It would be at the height of injustice for the Court to await respondent to file an expropriation suit considering that until now, respondent remained adamant that it acquired ownership of the property by virtue of the 1954 donation. Respondent may opt not to even file an expropriation case because it is already enjoying the rights of use and possession over the property to the extreme prejudice of petitioners.

Meanwhile, even assuming that there was "taking" of property in 1954, just compensation should still be reckoned from the time that petitioners filed the complaint.

In National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay (Heirs of Sangkay), the NPC constructed a tunnel without the consent and knowledge of the owners and without going through formal expropriation proceedings. The Court held that the value of the property at the time the owners commenced the inverse condemnation proceedings should be the basis of just compensation, despite the taking of the property way back in 1979. The Court's disquisition is enlightening:

We rule that the reckoning value is the value at the time of the filing of the complaint, as the RTC provided in its decision. Compensation that is reckoned on the market value prevailing at the time either when NPC entered or when it completed the tunnel, as NPC submits, would not be just, for it would compound the gross unfairness already caused to the owners by NPC's entering without the intention of formally expropriating the land, and without the prior knowledge and consent of the Heirs of Macabangkit. NPC's entry denied elementary due process of law to the owners since then until the owners commenced the inverse condemnation proceedings. The Court is more concerned with the necessity to prevent NPC from unjustly profiting from its deliberate acts of denying due process of law to the owners. As a measure of simple justice and ordinary fairness to them, therefore, reckoning just compensation on the value at the time the owners commenced these inverse condemnation proceedings is entirely warranted.

In National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, a case that involved the similar construction of an underground tunnel by NPC without the prior consent and knowledge of the owners, and in which we held that the basis in fixing just compensation when the initiation of the action preceded the entry into the property was the time of the filing of the complaint, not the time of taking, we pointed out that there was no taking when the entry by NPC was made "without intent to expropriate or was not made under warrant or color of legal authority." (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

In National Power Corp. v. Spouses Saludares (Spouses Saludares), the landowners filed an inverse condemnation proceeding against NPC alleging that the latter erected high-tension transmission lines in their property without compensating them. NPC argued that it already paid the owners in compliance with the final and executory decision in National Power Corporation v. Pereyras. The Court ruled that the just compensation for the property should be determined at the time of filing of the complaint for inverse condemnation, thus:

Indeed, respondent spouses would be deprived of their right to just compensation if the value of the property is pegged back to its value in the 1970s. To reiterate, NAPOCOR should have instituted eminent domain proceedings before it occupied respondent spouses' property. Because it failed to comply with this duty, respondent spouses were constrained to file the instant Complaint for just compensation before the trial court. From the 1970s until the present, they were deprived of just compensation, while NAPOCOR continuously burdened their property with its transmission lines. This Court cannot allow petitioner to profit from its failure to comply with the mandate of the law. We therefore rule that, to adequately compensate respondent spouses from the decades of burden on their property, NAPOCOR should be made to pay the value of the property at the time of the filing of the instant Complaint when respondent spouses made a judicial demand for just compensation. (Emphasis supplied)

In Heirs of Sangkay and in Saludares, the Court pegged the value of the property at the time of filing of the complaint for inverse condemnation due to special circumstances. In the first case, the NPC employed stealth in entering the property instead of complying with the legal process. In the second case, the NPC refused to acknowledge the landowner's claim and insisted that it already paid just compensation, evincing that it had no intention to pay.

Similarly, it is my humble opinion that special circumstances also exist here, warranting the application of the aforementioned cases. Respondent had no intention of paying just compensation to petitioners as it insisted until now that the property was validly donated. This is despite the fact that respondent was fully aware that it did not comply with the condition attached to the donation. Worse, respondent offered to purchase petitioners' property way back in 1959 but until the institution of the ejectment suit, the sale did not materialize. Even though respondent was aware of the flaw in its possession of the property, it did not file a formal expropriation proceeding. Hence, to peg the value of the property at the time of the donation in 1954 or in the alleged cessation of tolerance in 1968 would be unfair to petitioners. 

The Court's ruling in Forfom is inapplicable.

I am aware that there is a string of cases where the Court uniformly held that the time of taking is controlling for purposes of just compensation. These are cases where the government took possession and control of the property for public use without initiating expropriation proceedings and without payment of just compensation. Spouses Tecson summarized these cases in this wise:

In Forfom Development Corporation [Forfom] v. Philippine National Railways [PNR], PNR entered the property of Forfom in January 1973 for public use, that is, for railroad tracks, facilities and appurtenances for use of the Carmona Commuter Service without initiating expropriation proceedings. In 1990, Forfom filed a complaint for recovery of possession of real property and/or damages against PNR. In Eusebio v. Luis, respondent's parcel of land was taken in 1980 by the City of Pasig and used as a municipal road now known as A. Sandoval Avenue in Pasig City without the appropriate expropriation proceedings. In 1994, respondent demanded payment of the value of the property, but they could not agree on its valuation prompting respondent to file a complaint for reconveyance and/or damages against the city government and the mayor. In Manila International Airport Authority v. Rodriguez, in the early 1970s, petitioner implemented expansion programs for its runway necessitating the acquisition and occupation of some of the properties surrounding its premises. As to respondent's property, no expropriation proceedings were initiated. In 1997, respondent demanded the payment of the value of the property, but the demand remained unheeded prompting him to institute a case for accion reivindicatoria with damages against petitioner. In Republic v. Sarabia, sometime in 1956, the Air Transportation Office (ATO) took possession and control of a portion of a lot situated in Aklan, registered in the name of respondent, without initiating expropriation proceedings. Several structures were erected thereon including the control tower, the Kalibo crash fire rescue station, the Kalibo airport terminal and the headquarters of the PNP Aviation Security Group. In 1995, several stores and restaurants were constructed on the remaining portion of the lot. In 1997, respondent filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages against the storeowners where ATO intervened claiming that the storeowners were its lessees.

The Court in the above-mentioned cases was confronted with common factual circumstances where the government took control and possession of the subject properties for public use without initiating expropriation proceedings and without payment of just compensation, while the landowners failed for a long period of time to question such government act and later instituted actions for recovery of possession with damages. The Court thus determined the landowners' right to the payment of just compensation and, more importantly, the amount of just compensation. The Court has uniformly ruled that just compensation is the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling for purposes of compensation. x x x (Emphasis and italics in the original, citations omitted)

The common denominator between and among Forfom Development Corporation v. Phil. National Railways, Eusebio v. Luis, Manila International Airport Authority v. Rodriguez, and Republic v. Sarabia (collectively, Forfom, et al.) on one hand, and the present case, on the other hand, is the entry of the government into private property without the benefit of expropriation. The landowners were the ones who filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against the government. The difference lies, however, on the finding of the Court that in the first group of cases, the landowners stay silent or failed for a long period of time to question the government's act. Thus, they were deemed to have acquiesced to the taking.

On the contrary, Mariano, petitioners' predecessor, had taken steps to protect his right over the property. Likewise, petitioners were able to explain the delay in the filing of their suit against respondent. This was correctly discussed in the assailed Decision, to wit:

By his September 17, 1959 and May 14, 1968 letters, Macario has been shown to have taken steps to have the City act on Mayor Imperial's proposal to "buy instead" the subject property. His efforts were overtaken by his death three years later in 1971. Furthermore, as the RTC found, petitioners had been engaged in litigation to establish their right to inherit from Macario and Irene, and it was Danilo's discovery of the subject property, following the issuance to him of letters of administration over Irene's estate in 1997, that prompted them to issue a demand for the City to vacate the premises.

Given these circumstances, the Court is not disposed to conclude that there was an unreasonable or unexplained delay that will render petitioners' claim stale.

In contrast, the City, despite its claim of having acquired the subject property by donation in 1954, has itself failed to have the same transferred in its name for a long period of time. Indeed, the subject property remains registered in the name of petitioners' predecessor-in-interest as co-owner. (Emphasis supplied)

Considering that petitioners were not guilty of unreasonable delay in claiming ownership of their property against respondent, the ruling in Forfom, et al. that just compensation should be pegged at the time of taking of the property does not apply.

Nonetheless, as previously mentioned, the Court has already ruled that just compensation shall be computed from August 16, 1954, hence my position that just compensation should be reckoned as of February 12, 2004 will become the minority view.

Just Compensation

Proceeding from the Court's ruling that just compensation should be pegged at the time of taking on August 16, 1954, I quote with approval the innovative proposition of Justice Lazaro-Javier that inflation should be included in the computation of the fair market value of the property, viz.:

But since payment of just compensation was not made on August 16, 1954 and will not be forthcoming until the proceedings in the present case are decided, the property's fair market value on August 16, 1954 will necessarily be adjusted according to the terms below.

Firstly, the property's fair market value on August 16, 1954 must be the equivalent value of money at the time of payment. For example the value of P100.00 on August 16, 1954 will not be the same as the value of P100.00 at the time of payment. What the predecessors lost as, say, P100.00 on August 16, 1954, or the fair market value of the property on this date, will not be compensated by paying them P100.00 or the same face amount of fair market value on the date of payment. This is because of inflation. According to the Philippine Inflation Calculator available online, the goods that P100.00 could buy in 1960 would roughly cost P12,307.11 or 12,207.11% increase at the end of 2020. The cost of inflation must be factored in so that the true value of the loss suffered by the predecessors (or any landowner for that matter) is justly compensated.

Secondly, while the cost of inflation speaks to justify compensating the real value of the loss suffered by the landowner, which is the matter being compensated according to our jurisprudence, legal interest must also be imposed on the inflation-adjusted fair market value at the time of actual taking, since there was a forbearance of money as a result of the delay in the payment of just compensation.

Thus, a legal interest of 12% per annum on the inflation-adjusted fair market value at the time of accrual taking shall accrue from August 16, 1954 until June 30, 2013. From July 1, 2013 until the finality of the present Resolution of the Court, the inflation-adjusted fair market value at the time of actual taking shall earn legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum. Thereafter, the total amount of just compensation (i.e. the inflation-adjusted fair market value at the time of actual taking plus legal interests) shall earn legal interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this Resolution until full payment thereof".

The cost of inflation formula is the more realistic mode of arriving at the actual value of the property at the time of actual taking. The Court now has the opportunity to adopt the Lazaro-Javier formula in this landmark case.

Exemplary damages and rentals

Case law teaches that the failure of the government to initiate an expropriation proceeding to the prejudice of the landowner may be corrected with the awarding of exemplary damages. Hence, in Spouses Tecson, the Court granted P1,000,000.00 exemplary damages in favor of the landowners since they were deprived of beneficial ownership over their property for more than 68 years without the benefit of a timely expropriation proceedings and to serve as deterrent to the State from failing to institute proceedings within the prescribed period under the law.

For the same reasons stated above, the Court, in National Transmission Corp. v. Oroville Development Corp. also awarded exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00 to the owner of the property.

Accordingly, the ponencia correctly held that P1,000,000.00 exemplary damages are due to petitioners as they were deprived of the beneficial ownership of their property without the benefit of a timely expropriation. Respondent was in bad faith when it continuously possessed the property knowing that it did not comply with the condition of the donation. In addition, respondent did not honor its commitment to purchase the property despite repeated follow-up from Mariano.

With respect to the award of rentals to petitioners, I maintain my position that reasonable compensation must be paid to them from 1954 up to 2004. Conversely, at the risk of being repetitious, the Court has already reached a consensus that the award of rentals shall be deleted. For now, the issue has been resolved. 

Interest on the inflation-adjusted fair market value of the property

Interest is paid to the owner of the property to compensate him/her for any delay in the payment of compensation. It is a forbearance of money, and not indemnity for damages. At the time of the taking of the property on August 16, 1954, the interest rate applicable to loans and forbearance of money is six percent (6%) per annum per Act No. 2655. On July 29, 1974, the Central Bank (CB) issued CB Circular No. 416 increasing the rate to twelve percent (12%) per annum. This was followed by Circular No. 905 dated December 22, 1982 which maintained the 12% interest. However, on June 21, 2013, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas issued CB Circular No. 799 reducing the rate of interest on loans and forbearance of money from 12% to 6% per annum effective July 1, 2013. Hence, contrary to the ponencia, the just compensation in this case should be subject to 6% interest per annum from the date of taking on August 16, 1954 to July 28, 1974, then 12% interest per annum from July 29, 1974 to June 30, 2013, and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until finality of this Resolution.

In conformity with Nacar v. Gallery Frames, the total amount due to petitioners (that is, the inflation-adjusted fair market value of the property at the time of actual taking with interest plus damages and attorney's fees) shall earn legal interest of 6% per annum from finality of the Resolution until full payment.

Attorney's fees

Attorney's fees are due to petitioners in the amount of P75,000.00 since they were forced to file an ejectment complaint for the recovery of their property and in the process incurred expenses for the services of a lawyer. 

Clear and definitive ruling on the issue of taking without due compensation

For the guidance of the Bench, the Bar, and the public in general, the Court must make a pronouncement on the issue of taking of private property for public use by the government or a local government unit without the benefit of a formal expropriation proceeding.

The Court should emphasize that the only constitutional and legal way of acquiring private property for public use is by filing a complaint for expropriation under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Without the said complaint, the taking of any private property is illegal. To fully and justly compensate the property owner for the real value of the loss he/she suffered as of the date of taking, the cost of inflation formula proposed by Justice Lazaro-Javier should be used. Aside from this, legal interest, the rate of which shall be based on the relevant CB Circular, shall be imposed in the inflation­adjusted value of the property from the date of taking until June 30, 2013. From July 1, 2013 until finality of the case, the inflation-adjusted value shall earn legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum. When warranted by the circumstances, exemplary damages and attorney's fees must also be granted to the property owner. Lastly, the total amount of just compensation (that is, the inflation-adjusted value plus legal interests, damages, and attorney's fees) shall earn legal interest of 6% per annum from finality of the decision or resolution until full payment.

All told, I vote to GRANT petitioners' Second Motion for Reconsideration and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision dated March 12, 2018 and Resolution dated July 23, 2018 of the First Division of the Court, in that:

(1) The order for respondent and all government instrumentalities, agencies, and offices claiming right of possession through and under it to peacefully surrender and deliver to petitioners the physical possession of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 671, including all improvements and structures erected thereon, is hereby DELETED;

(2) The award of monthly rental in favor of petitioners in the amount of P1,250,00.00 computed from January 20, 1959 until February 11, 2004 is DELETED;

(3) The case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals under CA­G.R. SP No. 90547 for hearing, report, and recommendation on the proper amount of just compensation. The Court of Appeals is given three (3) months from notice to submit said report and recommendation to the Court. In determining the just compensation, the Court of Appeals will use August 16, 1954 as the date of taking. The Court of Appeals shall first apply the cost of inflation formula proposed by Justice Lazaro-Javier so that the true value of the loss suffered by petitioners is justly compensated.

(4) Respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioners with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of taking on August 16, 1954 to July 28, 1974, then twelve percent (12%) interest per annum from July 29, 1974 to June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until finality of the Resolution.

(5) Respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioners exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00.

(6) Respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioners attorney's fees in the amount of P75,000.00 and costs of suit.

(7) The total amount due to petitioners (that is, the inflation­adjusted fair market value of the property at the time of actual taking with interest plus damages and attorney's fees) shall earn legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of the Resolution until full payment.

Question 1

What was the basis of the Supreme Court's decision to grant the City of Naga's Second Motion for Reconsideration?

Suggested Answer

The Supreme Court granted the City of Naga's Second Motion for Reconsideration because the return of the property was no longer feasible due to the structures built on it, and the City of Naga's possession of the property was considered "taking" under the power of eminent domain, as defined in Republic v. Spouses Nocom, where the Court held that "taking" occurs when the government enters private property for more than a momentary period, devotes it to a public use, and ousts the owner, depriving him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

 

Question 2

What is the proper remedy for the petitioners in case of unlawful possession of their property by the City of Naga?

Suggested Answer

The proper remedy for the petitioners is payment of just compensation, computed in accordance with the formula laid down in Republic v. Spouses Nocom, which requires consideration of the value of the property at the time of taking and the interest earned over time. This is based on the principle of just compensation enshrined in Article III, Section 9 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which states that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."

 

Question 3

How will the just compensation be computed?

Suggested Answer

The just compensation will be computed using the present value method, taking into account the value of the property at the time of taking and the interest earned over time, as provided in Republic v. Spouses Nocom. This method ensures that the landowner is fairly compensated for the loss of their property.

 

Question 4

What is the significance of the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Gaerlan?

Suggested Answer

The concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Gaerlan emphasizes the importance of considering the cost of inflation in computing just compensation and proposes a different formula for computing just compensation, which takes into account the inflation-adjusted fair market value of the property. This highlights the need for a nuanced approach to computing just compensation that reflects the true value of the property.

 

Question 5

What is the legal basis for the Supreme Court's decision?

Suggested Answer

The legal basis for the Supreme Court's decision is Article 217 of the Civil Code (Eminent Domain), Republic v. Spouses Nocom (computation of just compensation), Secretary of DPWH v. Spouses Tecson (remedies available to landowners in cases of taking without expropriation proceedings), and Manila Railroad Co. v. Paredes (doctrine of eminent domain). These laws and jurisprudence provide the framework for determining just compensation in cases of taking by the government.

 

Question 6

What is the significance of the case?

Suggested Answer

The case highlights the importance of determining the feasibility of returning a property in cases of unlawful possession and the proper remedy for landowners in cases of taking by the government without expropriation proceedings. It also emphasizes the need for the government to pay just compensation for the taking of private property, as required by the Constitution.

 

Question 7

What is the doctrine of laches, and how does it apply to this case?

Suggested Answer

The doctrine of laches is a principle that bars a claim due to unreasonable delay in asserting one's rights. In this case, the Supreme Court found that laches did not bar the petitioners' claim, as they had taken steps to protect their rights over the property, including filing a complaint for unlawful detainer.

 

Question 8

What is the significance of the concept of "taking" in this case?

Suggested Answer

The concept of "taking" is significant in this case because it determines the point in time when the government's possession of the property becomes lawful, and the landowner's right to just compensation accrues. As defined in Republic v. Vda. de Castellvi, "taking" occurs when the government enters private property for more than a momentary period, devotes it to a public use, and ousts the owner, depriving him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

 

Question 9

How does the Court's decision affect the rights of landowners in cases of taking by the government?

Suggested Answer

The Court's decision emphasizes the importance of paying just compensation to landowners in cases of taking by the government without expropriation proceedings. This ensures that landowners are fairly compensated for the loss of their property and promotes the rule of law.

 

Question 10

What is the role of the Court of Appeals in this case?

Suggested Answer

The Court of Appeals will determine the proper amount of just compensation to be paid to the petitioners, taking into account the formula laid down in Republic v. Spouses Nocom and the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Gaerlan.

 

Question 11

What is the formula for computing just compensation proposed by Justice Lazaro-Javier?

Suggested Answer

The formula proposed by Justice Lazaro-Javier takes into account the cost of inflation and imposes legal interest on the inflation-adjusted fair market value of the property. This approach ensures that the landowner is fairly compensated for the loss of their property, considering the effects of inflation over time.

 

Question 12

Why did the Court award exemplary damages to the petitioners?

Suggested Answer

The Court awarded exemplary damages to the petitioners due to the City of Naga's deplorable act of establishing public offices on the property despite the invalidity of the donation. This highlights the need for the government to act in good faith and respect the rights of landowners.

 

Question 13

What is the significance of the concept of inverse condemnation in this case?

Suggested Answer

The concept of inverse condemnation is significant in this case because it allows the landowner to recover the value of the property taken by the government without formal expropriation proceedings. This ensures that landowners are fairly compensated for the loss of their property.

 

Question 14

How does the Court's decision promote the rule of law?

Suggested Answer

The Court's decision promotes the rule of law by emphasizing the importance of paying just compensation to landowners in cases of taking by the government without expropriation proceedings. This ensures that the government acts in accordance with the law and respects the rights of landowners.

 

Question 15

What is the impact of the case on the relationship between the government and landowners?

Suggested Answer

The case highlights the importance of balancing the government's power of eminent domain with the rights of landowners to just compensation. This promotes a fair and just relationship between the government and landowners.

 

Question 16

What are the implications of the case for future cases involving taking by the government?

Suggested Answer

The case sets a precedent for future cases involving taking by the government without expropriation proceedings, emphasizing the importance of paying just compensation to landowners. This ensures that landowners are fairly compensated for the loss of their property.

 

Question 17

How does the Court's decision reflect the principle of just compensation?

Suggested Answer

The Court's decision reflects the principle of just compensation by emphasizing the importance of paying fair and reasonable compensation to landowners for the taking of their property. This ensures that landowners are not unfairly deprived of their property without adequate compensation.

 

Question 18

What is the significance of the present value method in computing just compensation?

Suggested Answer

The present value method is significant in computing just compensation because it takes into account the value of the property at the time of taking and the interest earned over time. This ensures that landowners are fairly compensated for the loss of their property.

 

Question 19

How does the Court's decision promote fairness and justice?

Suggested Answer

The Court's decision promotes fairness and justice by emphasizing the importance of paying just compensation to landowners for the taking of their property. This ensures that landowners are treated fairly and justly in cases of taking by the government.

 

Question 20

What are the key takeaways from the case?

Suggested Answer

The key takeaways from the case are that laches may not bar a claim for recovery of possession if the petitioners can demonstrate that they have not abandoned their rights, the feasibility of returning a property is a crucial factor in determining the proper remedy, and the government must pay just compensation for the taking of private property, computed in accordance with the formula laid down in Republic v. Spouses Nocom.

 

Question 21: Just Compensation and Inflation

Discuss the significance of considering inflation in computing just compensation in cases of eminent domain. How would the application of the inflation-adjusted fair market value formula proposed in the concurring and dissenting opinion impact the determination of just compensation in this case?

Suggested Answer

Considering inflation in computing just compensation is crucial to ensure that landowners receive fair and just compensation for the taking of their property. The inflation-adjusted fair market value formula proposed in the concurring and dissenting opinion would impact the determination of just compensation in this case by taking into account the decrease in the purchasing power of money over time. This approach is supported by jurisprudence, which emphasizes the importance of considering the true value of the property taken, rather than just its nominal value (Republic v. Spouses Nocom, G.R. No. 147593, April 24, 2006).

The application of this formula would result in a more accurate computation of just compensation, reflecting the actual value of the property taken. This is in line with the constitutional mandate that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation (Article III, Section 9, 1987 Philippine Constitution).

 

Question 22: Laches and Unlawful Possession

Analyze the doctrine of laches and its application to cases of unlawful possession of property by the government. How does the Court's decision in this case reflect the principles of laches, and what implications does this have for future cases involving similar facts?

Suggested Answer

The doctrine of laches is an equitable principle that bars a claim due to unreasonable delay in asserting one's rights. In cases of unlawful possession of property by the government, laches may be invoked if the landowner fails to assert their rights in a timely manner, resulting in prejudice to the government ( Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968).

In this case, the Court's decision reflects the principles of laches by finding that the petitioners' claim is not barred by laches, despite the delay in asserting their rights. The Court considered the circumstances of the case, including the petitioners' efforts to protect their rights and the government's knowledge of the invalidity of the donation. This decision highlights the importance of considering the specific facts of each case in applying the doctrine of laches.

 

Question 23: Eminent Domain and Taking

Discuss the concept of "taking" in the context of eminent domain, and how it applies to this case. What are the implications of the Court's decision on the rights of landowners in cases of taking by the government without expropriation proceedings?

Suggested Answer

The concept of "taking" in the context of eminent domain refers to the act of the government entering private property for more than a momentary period, devoting it to a public use, and ousting the owner, depriving him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property (Republic v. Vda. de Castellvi, G.R. No. L-20625, April 29, 1966).

In this case, the Court's decision finds that the City of Naga's possession of the property constitutes "taking" under the power of eminent domain, despite the invalidity of the donation. This decision has implications for the rights of landowners in cases of taking by the government without expropriation proceedings, highlighting the importance of paying just compensation to landowners for the taking of their property.

 

Question 24: Exemplary Damages and Government Accountability

Analyze the award of exemplary damages in this case and its implications for government accountability. How does the Court's decision promote transparency and fairness in government dealings with private property owners?

Suggested Answer

The award of exemplary damages in this case serves as a deterrent to the government to act in good faith and respect the rights of private property owners. The Court's decision promotes transparency and fairness in government dealings with private property owners by emphasizing the importance of following due process and paying just compensation for the taking of private property.

This decision is in line with jurisprudence, which holds that exemplary damages may be awarded in cases where the government acts in a manner that is oppressive, arbitrary, or unjust (Section 2232, Civil Code). The award of exemplary damages in this case highlights the importance of government accountability and the need for transparency in government dealings with private property owners.

 

Question 25: Inverse Condemnation and Just Compensation

Discuss the concept of inverse condemnation and its application to cases of taking by the government without expropriation proceedings. How does the Court's decision in this case reflect the principles of inverse condemnation, and what implications does this have for future cases involving similar facts?

Suggested Answer

Inverse condemnation is a remedy available to landowners in cases of taking by the government without expropriation proceedings. It allows landowners to recover the value of their property taken by the government, even if no formal expropriation proceedings have been initiated (National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay, G.R. No. 165828, April 23, 2009).

In this case, the Court's decision reflects the principles of inverse condemnation by finding that the City of Naga's possession of the property constitutes "taking" under the power of eminent domain, and that the petitioners are entitled to just compensation. This decision has implications for future cases involving similar facts, highlighting the importance of paying just compensation to landowners for the taking of their property.

 

Question 26: Balancing Government Power and Private Property Rights

Analyze the balance between the government's power of eminent domain and the rights of private property owners. How does the Court's decision in this case promote fairness and justice in the exercise of eminent domain?

Suggested Answer

The government's power of eminent domain is a necessary aspect of its authority to promote the public good. However, this power must be balanced with the rights of private property owners to ensure that they are treated fairly and justly.

The Court's decision in this case promotes fairness and justice in the exercise of eminent domain by emphasizing the importance of paying just compensation to landowners for the taking of their property. This decision highlights the need for the government to act in good faith and respect the rights of private property owners, ensuring that the exercise of eminent domain is not arbitrary or oppressive.

 

Question 27: The Role of the Court of Appeals in Determining Just Compensation

Discuss the role of the Court of Appeals in determining just compensation in cases of taking by the government. How does the Court's decision in this case reflect the importance of the Court of Appeals in ensuring that landowners receive fair and just compensation for the taking of their property?

Suggested Answer

The Court of Appeals plays a crucial role in determining just compensation in cases of taking by the government. In this case, the Court's decision remands the case to the Court of Appeals to determine the proper amount of just compensation to be paid to the petitioners.

This decision highlights the importance of the Court of Appeals in ensuring that landowners receive fair and just compensation for the taking of their property. The Court of Appeals is tasked with determining the fair market value of the property taken, taking into account the specific circumstances of the case.

 

Question 28: The Significance of the Present Value Method in Computing Just Compensation

Analyze the present value method of computing just compensation and its significance in ensuring that landowners receive fair and just compensation for the taking of their property. How does the Court's decision in this case reflect the importance of using this method in computing just compensation?

Suggested Answer

The present value method of computing just compensation takes into account the value of the property at the time of taking and the interest earned over time. This method ensures that landowners receive fair and just compensation for the taking of their property, reflecting the true value of the property taken.

The Court's decision in this case reflects the importance of using this method in computing just compensation, highlighting the need to consider the specific circumstances of each case in determining the fair market value of the property taken. This approach ensures that landowners receive fair and just compensation for the taking of their property.

 

Question 29

Is the doctrine of laches applicable in cases of unlawful possession of property by the government?

Answer

Yes. The doctrine of laches is applicable in cases of unlawful possession of property by the government, but its application depends on the specific circumstances of each case, including the landowner's efforts to protect their rights and the government's knowledge of the invalidity of their possession.

 

Question 30

Can the government take private property without paying just compensation?

Answer

No. The government cannot take private property without paying just compensation, as this is a constitutional requirement (Article III, Section 9, 1987 Philippine Constitution). The payment of just compensation is a fundamental right of landowners, and the government's failure to pay just compensation would be a violation of this right.

 

Question 31

Is inverse condemnation a remedy available to landowners in cases of taking by the government without expropriation proceedings?

Answer

Yes. Inverse condemnation is a remedy available to landowners in cases of taking by the government without expropriation proceedings, allowing them to recover the value of their property taken by the government (National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay, G.R. No. 165828, April 23, 2009).

 

Question 32

Can exemplary damages be awarded in cases of taking by the government without expropriation proceedings?

Answer

Yes. Exemplary damages can be awarded in cases of taking by the government without expropriation proceedings, particularly if the government's actions are deemed oppressive, arbitrary, or unjust (Section 2232, Civil Code).

 

Question 33

Is the present value method of computing just compensation a widely accepted approach?

Answer

Yes. The present value method of computing just compensation is a widely accepted approach, taking into account the value of the property at the time of taking and the interest earned over time. This approach ensures that landowners receive fair and just compensation for the taking of their property.

 

Question 34

Can the government acquire private property through donation?

Answer

Yes. The government can acquire private property through donation, but the donation must be valid and comply with the requirements of the law. In this case, the donation was deemed invalid due to the non-compliance with the condition attached to it.

 

Question 35

Is the Court of Appeals' determination of just compensation final?

Answer

No. The Court of Appeals' determination of just compensation is not final, as it is subject to review by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has the authority to review the Court of Appeals' decision and determine the proper amount of just compensation to be paid to the landowners.

 

Question 36

Can landowners recover possession of their property taken by the government without expropriation proceedings?

Answer

No. Landowners may not be able to recover possession of their property taken by the government without expropriation proceedings, particularly if the property has been devoted to a public use. In such cases, the landowners' remedy is to seek just compensation for the taking of their property.