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The consolidated petitions are DISMISSED. The Court holds that respondent Marcos, Jr. is qualified to run for President, and that his COC is valid.

This Court is well-aware of its singular responsibility. This is not the first time that We are asked to decide whether a candidate for President is qualified after elections have been conducted, votes have been counted, and winners have been proclaimed. There is precedent to declare this case moot had respondent Marcos, Jr. not garnered the highest number of votes

In the cases where the qualifications of a presidential candidate were questioned, the issues sought to be determined involved questions on citizenship, and both citizenship and residency. These issues were definitively decided before the conduct of the elections.

The cases involving the winners of the two highest positions in the Executive branch that were decided after the conduct of the elections did not question the qualifications of the candidates or the validity of their COCs. All of these cases were election protests, adjudicated by this Court acting as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), where the second placers questioned the number of votes of the proclaimed winners and sought to be proclaimed in their stead.

This Court, in all the cases involving controversies over the candidacies or election of the President or Vice-President, has always asserted its jurisdiction to decide the cases brought before it under the authority vested upon it by the Constitution. We take the same stance here and decide on the issues raised in the present Petitions.

We deem it necessary to state at the outset that the qualifications for the candidates for President are not limited to those enumerated in the Constitution. Section 2, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-­born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.

Additionally, a candidate for President may also find his or her COC canceled under grounds found in statutes such as the OEC. Specifically, Section 69 of the OEC has laid down the requirements to weed out nuisance candidates for elective positions, including those for President. 

It reads:
Sec. 69. Nuisance candidates. - The Commission may motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that said certificate has been filed to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.

We acknowledge that there are distinctions between the remedies sought by the petitioners in these consolidated cases. The present petitions stem from two cases before the COMELEC: (1) SPA Case No. 21-156 (DC), filed by petitioners Buenafe, et al., which sought to deny due course to or cancel respondent Marcos, Jr.'s COC; and (2) SPA No. 21-212 (DC), filed by petitioners Ilagan, et al., which sought to disqualify respondent Marcos, Jr. as a candidate for President.

A petition to deny due course to or cancel COC is governed by Section 78 in relation to Section 74, of the OEC, to wit:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. — The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge. xxx (Emphases supplied.)

On the other hand, a petition for disqualification may be filed pursuant to Sections 12 or 68 of the OEC. The provisions under the OEC state, in relevant part:

Sec. 12. Disqualifications. – Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

These disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.

xxx

Sec. 68. Disqualifications. – Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.

Apart from having the same respondent, these consolidated petitions share further similarities. For one, they are both pre-election remedies with a similar objective: to prevent a purportedly ineligible candidate from running for an elective position. In addition, they can be filed by any registered voter or any duly registered political party, organization, or coalition of political parties.

On this score, and based on our examination of the records, there appears to be no real disagreement on the matter of petitioners' standing to file these cases. The records show that the present Petitions were filed by petitioners Buenafe, et al. and Ilagan, et al. in their capacities as citizens, registered voters, martial law victims and rights advocates.^[138] Although the COMELEC did not appear to have any issues on the matter initially, it now contests petitioners' standing, on the theory that the instant petitions have been rendered moot by respondent Marcos, Jr.'s supervening proclamation. The COMELEC maintains that since the issues raised against respondent Marcos, Jr.'s qualifications are essentially election contests, which fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the PET, petitioners, to have standing, must show proof that they were either a registered candidate for the presidency who received the second or third highest number of votes, or a voter who voted in the May 2022 elections.

We will discuss the questions of mootness and jurisdiction in another part of this Decision. Nevertheless and for purposes of settling the issue of standing, suffice to state that petitioners, as the parties aggrieved by the denial of their respective petitions before the COMELEC, are allowed under the Rules of Court to assail the judgment or final order or resolution of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Significantly, respondent Marcos, Jr. never challenged petitioners' standing in any of the pleadings he filed before the COMELEC and this Court.
 

Ultimately, however, a petition to deny due course to or to cancel COC and a petition for disqualification are "different remedies, based on different grounds, and resulting in different eventualities."

First, the two remedies are anchored on distinct grounds: whereas an action under Section 78 of the OEC is concerned with the false representation by a candidate as to material information in the COC, a petition for disqualification relates to the declaration of a candidate as ineligible or lacking in quality or accomplishment fit for the elective position said candidate is seeking. To prosper, the former requires proof of deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact relating to the candidate's requisite residency, age, citizenship, or any other legal qualification necessary to run for elective office; the latter, possession of a disqualification as declared by a final decision of a competent court, or as found by the Commission.

Second, they have different prescriptive periods: a petition to deny due course to or cancel a COC may be filed within five days from the last day of filing of COCs, but not later than 25 days from the filing of the COC sought to be canceled; a petition for disqualification may be filed any day after the last day of the filing of COC, but not later than the date of the proclamation.

Third, both have markedly distinct effects: a disqualified person is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, while the person whose certificate is canceled or denied due course is not treated as a candidate at all. Moreover, a disqualified candidate may still be substituted if they had a valid COC in the first place. However, one whose COC was denied due course or canceled cannot be substituted because the law considers him or her to not have been a candidate at all.

While the grounds for a petition for disqualification are limited to Sections 12 and 68 of the OEC, and, for local elective officials, Section 40 of the LGC, the same grounds may be invoked in a petition to deny due course to or cancel COC if these involve the representations required under Section 78.

The case of Chua v. COMELEC (Chua) is instructive on this point. In Chua, a Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or Cancel COC was filed against Arlene Chua on the date of her proclamation as councilor based on the allegation that she was a dual citizen and a permanent resident of the United States of America (U.S.). Notwithstanding the caption of the petition, the COMELEC considered the same as one for Disqualification since the ground cited falls under Section 40 of the LGC. As such, the COMELEC found that the petition was timely filed pursuant to Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended. The Court, faced with the issue of whether the petition was for disqualification or to deny due course to or cancel COC, elucidated that the choice of remedy lies with the petitioner, to wit:

It is true that under Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code, persons who file their certificates of candidacy declare that they are not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country. Therefore, a petition to deny due course [to] or cancel a certificate of candidacy may likewise be filed against a permanent resident of a foreign country seeking an elective post in the Philippines on the ground of material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy.

What remedy to avail himself or herself of, however, depends on the petitioner. If the false material representation in the certificate of candidacy relates to a ground for disqualification, the petitioner may choose whether to file a petition to deny due course [to] or cancel a certificate of candidacy or a petition for disqualification, so long as the petition filed complies with the requirements under the law.

Before the Commission on Elections, private respondent Fragata had a choice of filing either a petition to deny due course [to] or cancel petitioner's certificate of candidacy or a petition for disqualification. xxx (Emphasis supplied.)

As in Chua, Section 12 of the OEC may likewise be invoked as a ground for a petition to deny due course to or cancel COC since Section 74 of the OEC requires a person filing a COC to declare that he is eligible for office. Thus, in Ty-Delgado v. HRET (Ty-Delgado), We found that therein petitioner committed false material representation in his COC as to his eligibility given that he had been convicted by a final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude, which is a ground for disqualification under Section 12 of the OEC.
  

A case is moot when a supervening event has terminated the legal issue between the parties, such that this Court is left with nothing to resolve. It can no longer grant any relief or enforce any right, and anything it says on the matter will have no practical use or value. This is not the scenario We have here.

The issues raised in both the Buenafe and Ilagan Petitions – whether respondent Marcos, Jr. is guilty of material misrepresentation of his eligibility and whether he suffers any of the grounds for disqualification – are not rendered moot by his receipt of the highest number of votes or by his subsequent proclamation. The petitions raise fundamental questions as to whether respondent Marcos, Jr. is qualified to be a candidate for President. These are actual and justiciable controversies that the Court must resolve in the exercise of its judicial power. We cannot stress enough that the qualification of the candidate is not waived by his or her subsequent election to the office. A candidate may obtain 99% of the votes cast, but if he or she is found to possess any of the grounds for disqualification, our laws prohibit such candidate from occupying public office.

In its Comment, the COMELEC argues that the case was mooted by the completion of the electoral process, where respondent Marcos, Jr. obtained an overwhelming number of votes, and his proclamation as the President-elect.

However, the cases relied upon by the COMELEC are not on all fours with the present Petitions. In Perez v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, We ruled that a provincial fiscal is deemed ipso facto resigned from office upon his filing of a COC for Mayor of Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija. Meanwhile, in Morelos v. Dela Rosa, We dismissed a petition to annul the election of barrio officials for being moot due to the expiration of their term of office.

The COMELEC's use of Our pronouncement in Quizon v. COMELEC (Quizon) should likewise be clarified. To justify overlooking irregularities in the COC, We explained:

As to the alleged irregularity in the filing of the certificate of candidacy, it is important to note that this Court has repeatedly held that provisions of the election law regarding certificates of candidacy, such as signing and swearing on the same, as well as the information required to be stated therein, are considered mandatory prior to the elections. Thereafter, they are regarded as merely directory to give effect to the will of the people. In the instant case, Puno won by an overwhelming number of votes. Technicalities should not be permitted to defeat the intention of the voter, especially so if that intention is discoverable from the ballot itself, as in this case. (Emphasis supplied and citations omitted.)

We underscore, however, that Our pronouncement in Quizon is limited to technical irregularities in the COC (such as signing and swearing on the same and information required to be stated) and not the eligibility of a candidate.
 

Respondent Marcos, Jr. and the COMELEC argue that this Court has no jurisdiction over the Petitions since exclusive jurisdiction now lies with the PET.

The last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[t]he Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests, relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate rules for the purpose." This is echoed in Rule 13 of A.M. No. 10-4-29-SC, or the 2010 Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, which reads:

Rule 13. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the Philippines.

The 1987 Constitution mandates the creation of Electoral Tribunals for only four offices: President, Vice-President, Senator, and Member of the House of Representatives. It is recognized that Section 4, Article VII, which refers to the President and Vice-President, is similarly worded to Section 17, Article VI, which refers to Senators and Members of the House of Representatives. Both provisions describe the respective Electoral Tribunals as being the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective subjects. The rulings on the trigger point for the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) are thus instructive for identifying when the jurisdiction of the PET should be invoked.

Our ruling in Reyes v. Commission on Elections (Reyes) painstakingly described the conditions for the exercise of the jurisdiction of the HRET:

First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications, as well as over the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition is duly filed with said tribunal. Petitioner has not averred that she has filed such action.

Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:

Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.

As held in Marcos v. COMELEC, the HRET does not have jurisdiction over a candidate who is not a member of the House of Representatives, to wit:

As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question. (Emphasis supplied.)

The next inquiry, then, is when is a candidate considered a Member of the House of Representatives?

In Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC citing Aggabao v. COMELEC and Guerrero v. COMELEC, the Court ruled that:

The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. (Emphasis supplied.)

This pronouncement was reiterated in the case of Limkaichong v. COMELEC, wherein the Court, referring to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC vis-à-vis the HRET, held that:

The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. (Emphasis supplied.)

This was again affirmed in Gonzalez v. COMELEC, to wit:

After proclamation, taking of oath and assumption of office by Gonzalez, jurisdiction over the matter of his qualifications, as well as questions regarding the conduct of election and contested returns — were transferred to the HRET as the constitutional body created to pass upon the same. (Emphasis supplied.)

From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office. (Citations omitted)

Applying the ruling in Reyes to the present petitions, this Court, sitting En Banc, can only take cognizance of an election contest if the following requisites concur: (a) a petition is filed before it; and (b) the petition is filed against a Presidential or Vice-Presidential candidate who has been validly proclaimed, properly taken his or her oath, and assumed office.

These conditions are not present here. The Buenafe and Ilagan Petitions are filed under Rule 65 assailing the Resolutions of the COMELEC En Banc. While respondent Marcos, Jr. has been proclaimed as the Presidential candidate with the highest number of obtained votes, he has yet to take his oath and assume office. As Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez astutely pointed out, the term of office begins at noon on the 30^th day of June following the election. Hence, as long as the petitions remain with this Court before 30 June 2022, this Court has jurisdiction to resolve them.
 

Based on current records, no petition for an election contest has been filed before the PET. An election protest should be filed within thirty days after the proclamation of the winner.^[166] On the other hand, a petition for quo warranto should be filed within ten days after the proclamation of the winner.

The petitioner in an election protest is limited to the registered candidate for President or Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes. On the other hand, a quo warranto case may be filed by any registered voter who has voted in the election concerned.

An election protest is anchored on allegations of electoral frauds, anomalies, or irregularities in the protested precincts, while a petition for quo warranto attacks the protestee's ineligibility or specific acts of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines.

In any case, the proclamation, oath-taking, and assumption of the President result in removing from the jurisdiction of this Court any pre-­proclamation remedy elevated to the Court from the COMELEC.
 

The peculiar scenario availing here is that the present Petitions are pending before Us after the same were elevated from the COMELEC after the conduct of the elections. The PET, which is this Court sitting en banc, has to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the issues of election, returns, and qualification upon the assumption to office of respondent Marcos, Jr. The question then is: should We dismiss these petitions and wait for the same petitions to be filed before Us sitting as the PET?

To arrive at the answer, We revisit the history of the PET and its relation to the Court as elucidated in Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, thus:

Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7 of the 1987 Constitution is an innovation. The precursors of the present Constitution did not contain similar provisions and instead vested upon the legislature all phases of presidential and vice-presidential elections — from the canvassing of election returns, to the proclamation of the president-elect and the vice-­president elect, and even the determination, by ordinary legislation, of whether such proclamations may be contested. Unless the legislature enacted a law creating an institution that would hear election contests in the Presidential and Vice-Presidential race, a defeated candidate had no legal right to demand a recount of the votes cast for the office involved or to challenge the ineligibility of the proclaimed candidate. Effectively, presidential and vice-presidential contests were non-justiciable in the then prevailing milieu.

The omission in the 1935 Constitution was intentional. It was mainly influenced by the absence of a similar provision in its pattern, the Federal Constitution of the United States. Rather, the creation of such tribunal was left to the determination of the National Assembly. xxx

To fill the void in the 1935 Constitution, the National Assembly enacted R.A. No. 1793, establishing an independent PET to try, hear, and decide protests contesting the election of President and Vice-President. The Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court were tasked to sit as its Chairman and Members, respectively. Its composition was extended to retired Supreme Court Justices and incumbent Court of Appeals Justices who may be appointed as substitutes for ill, absent, or temporarily incapacitated regular members.

The eleven-member tribunal was empowered to promulgate rules for the conduct of its proceedings. It was mandated to sit en banc in deciding presidential and vice-presidential contests and authorized to exercise powers similar to those conferred upon courts of justice, including the issuance of subpoena, taking of depositions, arrest of witnesses to compel their appearance, production of documents and other evidence, and the power to punish contemptuous acts and bearings. The tribunal was assigned a Clerk, subordinate officers, and employees necessary for the efficient performance of its functions.

R.A. No. 1793 was implicitly repealed and superseded by the 1973 Constitution which replaced the bicameral legislature under the 1935 Constitution with the unicameral body of a parliamentary government.

With the 1973 Constitution, a PET was rendered irrelevant, considering that the President was not directly chosen by the people but elected from among the members of the National Assembly, while the position of Vice-President was constitutionally non-existent.

In 1981, several modifications were introduced to the parliamentary system. Executive power was restored to the President who was elected directly by the people. An Executive Committee was formed to assist the President in the performance of his functions and duties. Eventually, the Executive Committee was abolished and the Office of Vice-President was installed anew.

These changes prompted the National Assembly to revive the PET by enacting, on December 3, 1985, Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 884, entitled "An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Election Contests in the Office of the President and Vice-President of the Philippines, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes." This tribunal was composed of nine members, three of whom were the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and two Associate Justices designated by him, while the six were divided equally between representatives of the majority and minority parties in the Batasang Pambansa.

Aside from the license to wield powers akin to those of a court of justice, the PET was permitted to recommend the prosecution of persons, whether public officers or private individuals, who in its opinion had participated in any irregularity connected with the canvassing and/or accomplishing of election returns.

The independence of the tribunal was highlighted by a provision allocating a specific budget from the national treasury or Special Activities Fund for its operational expenses. It was empowered to appoint its own clerk in accordance with its rules. However, the subordinate officers were strictly employees of the judiciary or other officers of the government who were merely designated to the tribunal.

xxx

With R.A. No. 1793 as framework, the 1986 Constitutional Commission transformed the then statutory PET into a constitutional institution, albeit without its traditional nomenclature:

FR. BERNAS.

....

.... So it became necessary to create a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. What we have done is to constitutionalize what was statutory but it is not an infringement on the separation of powers because the power being given to the Supreme Court is a judicial power.

xxx

Be that as it may, we hasten to clarify the structure of the PET as a legitimate progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, composed of members of the Supreme Court, sitting en banc. xxx

The "constitutionalization" of the PET has been described as independent but not separate from the Judiciary. As such, the PET cannot be considered distinct from the Supreme Court, thus:

A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified in the provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme Court's exercise thereof. The Supreme Court's method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the provision for the Supreme Court to "promulgate its rules for the purpose."

The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent to the full authority conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives, i.e. the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which we have affirmed on numerous occasions.

Particularly cogent are the discussions of the Constitutional Commission on the parallel provisions of the SET and the HRET. The discussions point to the inevitable conclusion that the different electoral tribunals, with the Supreme Court functioning as the PET, are constitutional bodies, independent of the three departments of government — Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary — but not separate therefrom.

xxx

The view taken by Justices Adolfo S. Azcuna and Regalado E. Maambong is schooled by our holding in Lopez v. Roxas, et al.:

Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1793, which provides that:

"There shall be an independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal ... which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the president-elect and the vice-president-elect of the Philippines."

has the effect of giving said defeated candidate the legal right to contest judicially the election of the President-elect or Vice-President-elect and to demand a recount of the votes cast for the office involved in the litigation, as well as to secure a judgment declaring that he is the one elected president or vice-president, as the case may be, and that, as such, he is entitled to assume the duties attached to said office. And by providing, further, that the Presidential Electoral Tribunal "shall be composed of the Chief Justice and the other ten Members of the Supreme Court," said legislation has conferred upon such Court an additional original jurisdiction of an exclusive character.

Republic Act No. 1793 has not created a new or separate court. It has merely conferred upon the Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. The result of the enactment may be likened to the fact that courts of first instance perform the functions of such ordinary courts of first instance, those of court of land registration, those of probate courts, and those of courts of juvenile and domestic relations. It is, also, comparable to the situation obtaining when the municipal court of a provincial capital exercises its authority, pursuant to law, over a limited number of cases which were previously within the exclusive jurisdiction of courts of first instance.

In all of these instances, the court (court of first instance or municipal court) is only one, although the functions may be distinct and, even, separate. Thus the powers of a court of first instance, in the exercise of its jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases, are broader than, as well as distinct and separate from, those of the same court acting as a court of land registration or a probate court, or as a court of juvenile and domestic relations. So too, the authority of the municipal court of a provincial capital, when acting as such municipal court, is, territorially more limited than that of the same court when hearing the aforementioned cases which are primary within the jurisdiction of courts of first instance. In other words, there is only one court, although it may perform the functions pertaining to several types of courts, each having some characteristics different from those of the others.

Indeed, the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and courts of first instance, are vested with original jurisdiction, as well as with appellate jurisdiction, in consequence of which they are both trial courts and, appellate courts, without detracting from the fact that there is only one Supreme Court, one Court of Appeals, and one court of first instance, clothed with authority to discharge said dual functions. A court of first instance, when performing the functions of a probate court or a court of land registration, or a court of juvenile and domestic relations, although with powers less broad than those of a court of first instance, hearing ordinary actions, is not inferior to the latter, for one cannot be inferior to itself. So too, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is not inferior to the Supreme Court, since it is the same Court although the functions peculiar to the said Tribunal are more limited in scope than those of the Supreme Court in the exercise of its ordinary functions. Hence, the enactment of Republic Act No. 1793, does not entail an assumption by Congress of the power of appointment vested by the Constitution in the President. It merely connotes the imposition of additional duties upon the Members of the Supreme Court.

By the same token, the PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it has functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is obvious that the PET was constituted in implementation of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, and it faithfully complies — not unlawfully defies — the constitutional directive. The adoption of a separate seal, as well as the change in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices into Chairman and Members of the Tribunal, respectively, was designed simply to highlight the singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunal's functions as a special electoral court. (Emphasis supplied and citations omitted.)

When the Court acts as the PET, it is not a separate and distinct body from the Court itself. The constitutional provision refers to the same "Supreme Court sitting en banc." However, it should be recognized that the proceedings before the PET require a distinct set of rules of procedure owing to the very specific nature of its functions. Thus, the exercise of jurisdiction of the Court En Banc as the PET is likened to the characterization of specialized courts in relation to the then Courts of First Instance. They are the same courts having the same jurisdiction, only that specialized courts are intended for practicality. Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution therefore should not be considered as a limitation on the jurisdiction of the Court over the pending petitions.
 

Any person intending to run for public office needs to have the qualifications required under the law for the position he or she intends to hold. At the same time, he or she must also possess none of the grounds for disqualification under the law and the relevant regulations.

We reiterate that the qualifications for President and Vice-President are prescribed in Section 2, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. These qualifications are also found in Section 63 of the OEC.

There is no question that respondent Marcos, Jr. has all the qualifications of a candidate for President as provided under the Constitution and the OEC. Notably, neither the Buenafe Petition nor the Ilagan Petition alleges that respondent Marcos, Jr. lacks any of these qualifications: natural-­born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.

Petitioners Ilagan, et al. instead argue that respondent Marcos, Jr. has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and is thus disqualified from being a candidate and holding any government office under Section 12 of the OEC.

Notably, Section 68 of the OEC, which provides additional grounds for disqualification, namely, being found to have committed an election offense, or being a permanent resident of, or an immigrant in, a foreign country, is not being invoked in the present case. Hence, We limit Our discussion to the alleged disqualification of respondent Marcos, Jr. under Section 12 of the OEC.
 

The CA found respondent Marcos, Jr. guilty of failing to file income tax returns for the taxable years 1982 to 1985 in Criminal Cases No. Q-91-24391, Q-92-29212, Q-92-29213 and Q-92-29217. Petitioners Ilagan, et al. argue that this amounts to a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, which has the effect of disqualifying respondent Marcos, Jr. from being a candidate and from holding any government office. Failure to file income tax returns may or may not be a crime involving moral turpitude. We explain this below.

Not every criminal act involves moral turpitude, nor do they necessarily have to be heinous. Moral turpitude has been often understood to mean acts that are "contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general." It does not include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited.

Associate justice Arturo D. Brion, in his separate concurring opinion in Teves v. COMELEC, laid down the historical roots of moral turpitude. He explained:

I. Historical Roots

The term 'moral turpitude' first took root under the United States (U.S.) immigration laws. Its history can be traced back as far as the 17th century when the States of Virginia and Pennsylvania enacted the earliest immigration resolutions excluding criminals from America, in response to the British government's policy of sending convicts to the colonies. State legislators at that time strongly suspected that Europe was deliberately exporting its human liabilities. In the U.S., the term 'moral turpitude' first appeared in the Immigration Act of March 3, 1891, which directed the exclusion of persons who have been convicted of a felony or other infamous crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude; this marked the first time the U.S. Congress used the term 'moral turpitude' in immigration laws. Since then, the presence of moral turpitude has been used as a test in a variety of situations, including legislation governing the disbarment of attorneys and the revocation of medical licenses. Moral turpitude also has been judicially used as a criterion in disqualifying and impeaching witnesses, in determining the measure of contribution between joint tortfeasors, and in deciding whether a certain language is slanderous.

In 1951, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of the term 'moral turpitude' in Jordan v. De George. The case presented only one question: whether conspiracy to defraud the U.S. of taxes on distilled spirits is a crime involving moral turpitude within the meaning of Section 19 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1919 (Immigration Act). Sam de George, an Italian immigrant was convicted twice of conspiracy to defraud the U.S. government of taxes on distilled spirits. Subsequently, the Board of Immigration Appeals ordered de George's deportation on the basis of the Immigration Act provision that allows the deportation of aliens who commit multiple crimes involving moral turpitude. De George argued that he should not be deported because his tax evasion crimes did not involve moral turpitude. The U.S. Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Vinzon, disagreed, finding that 'under an unbroken course of judicial decisions, the crime of conspiring to defraud the U.S. is a crime involving moral turpitude.' Notably, the Court determined that fraudulent conduct involved moral turpitude without exception:

Whatever the phrase 'involving moral turpitude' may mean in peripheral cases, the decided cases make it plain that crimes in which fraud was an ingredient have always been regarded as involving moral turpitude. . . . Fraud is the touchstone by which this case should be judged. . . . We therefore decide that Congress sufficiently forewarned respondent that the statutory consequence of twice conspiring to defraud the United States is deportation.

Significantly, the U.S. Congress has never exactly defined what amounts to a 'crime involving moral turpitude.' The legislative history of statutes containing the moral turpitude standard indicates that Congress left the interpretation of the term to U.S. courts and administrative agencies. In the absence of legislative history as interpretative aid, American courts have resorted to the dictionary definition — 'the last resort of the baffled judge.' The most common definition of moral turpitude is similar to one found in the early editions of Black's Law Dictionary:

[An] act of baseness, vileness, or the depravity in private and social duties which man owes to his fellow man, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man. . . . Act or behavior that gravely violates moral sentiment or accepted moral standards of community and is a morally culpable quality held to be present in some criminal offenses as distinguished from others. . . . The quality of a crime involving grave infringement of the moral sentiment of the community as distinguished from statutory mala prohibita." (Emphasis supplied and citations omitted.)

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the concept of "moral turpitude" can be traced back to the immigration laws of the U.S. It is thus not surprising that in determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude, this Court has earlier used definitions from U.S. cases as reference.

It may be worth noting that under the U.S. Foreign Affairs Manual, the following are considered common crimes involving moral turpitude:

(a) crimes committed against property – making false representation, knowledge of such false representation by the perpetrator, reliance on the false representation by the person defrauded, intent to defraud, actual act of committing fraud, arson blackmail, burglary, embezzlement, extortion, false pretenses, forgery, fraud, larceny (grand or petty), malicious destruction of property, receiving stolen goods (with guilty knowledge), robbery, theft (when it involves the intention of permanent faking), transporting stolen property (with guilty knowledge), animal fighting, credit card/identity fraud, damaging private property (where intent to damage is not required), breaking and entering (if the statute does not require a specific or implicit intent to commit a crime involving moral turpitude), passing bad checks (where intent to defraud is not required by the statute), possessing stolen property (if guilty knowledge is not essential for a conviction under the statute), joy riding (where the intention to take the vehicle permanently is not required under the statute), and juvenile delinquency;

(b) crimes committed against government authority – bribery, counterfeiting, fraud-against revenue or other government functions, mail fraud, perjury, harboring a fugitive from justice (with guilty knowledge), and tax evasion (willful); and

(c) crimes committed against person, family relationship, and sexual morality – abandonment of a minor child (if willful and resulting in the destitution of the child), assault with intent to kill, assault with intent to commit rape, assault with intent to commit robbery, assault with intent to commit serious bodily harm, assault with a dangerous or deadly weapon, bigamy, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, gross indecency, incest (if the result of an improper sexual relationship), kidnapping, lewdness, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter (where the statute requires proof of recklessness generally will involve moral turpitude), mayhem, murder pandering, possession of child pornography, prostitution, and rape (including statutory rape).

In 1955, the Supreme Court of California, in Call v. State Bar of California, characterized moral turpitude as one that involves fraud, and must be distinguished from mere neglect or unintended failure, viz:

"The term moral turpitude includes fraud and has been said to mean dishonesty and conduct not in accordance with good morals; being based on moral guilt, it implies an intentional breach of the duty owed to a client as distinguished from an unintended failure to discharge his duties to the best of his ability."

In the 1990 case of In Re Grimes, it was ruled that willful commission of a crime does not automatically mean fraudulent, hence, it does not per se involve moral turpitude. In said case, petitioner attorney pleaded guilty to three (3)-counts of willfully failing to file a tax return. The Supreme Court of California found that petitioner's misconduct did not involve moral turpitude, but it did warrant discipline.

In the Philippines, we can trace the term moral turpitude as far back as 1901 in Act No. 190 (Code of Civil Actions and Special Proceedings). This law provided that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as lawyer by the Supreme Court upon conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Subsequently, moral turpitude found its way in statutes governing disqualifications of notaries public, priests and ministers in solemnizing marriages, registration to military service, exclusion and naturalization of aliens; discharge of the accused to be a state witness, admission to the bar, suspension and removal elective local officials, and disqualification of persons from running for any elective local position.

We first had occasion to characterize moral turpitude in the 1920 case of In Re Basa. This involves an interpretation of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the disbarment of a lawyer for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Carlos S. Basa, a lawyer, was convicted of the crime of abduction with consent. The sole question presented was whether the crime of abduction with consent, as punished by Article 446 of the Penal Code of 1887, involved moral turpitude. The Court, finding no exact definition in the statutes, turned to Bouvier's Law Dictionary for guidance and held:

'Moral turpitude,' it has been said, 'includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.' (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, cited by numerous courts.) Although no decision can be found which has decided the exact question, it cannot admit of doubt that crimes of this character involve moral turpitude. The inherent nature of the act is such that it is against good morals and the accepted rule of right conduct.

Thus, early on, the Philippines followed the American lead and adopted a general dictionary definition to interpret the concept of moral turpitude.

In subsequent cases, We continued borrowing definitions established in U.S. jurisprudence. In the 1959 case of Tak Ng v. Republic, We cited U.S. cases defining moral turpitude to pertain to an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties that a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.

Twenty years later, in 1979, in Zari v. Flores, We added that moral turpitude implies something immoral in itself, regardless of whether it is punishable by law or not. It must not merely be mala prohibita, the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute, establishes moral turpitude. Moral turpitude does not, however, include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in the fact of their being positively prohibited.

Meanwhile, in other cases, We examined the existence of moral turpitude based on the fraudulent intent of the offender. The Court in its 1964 decision in Ao Lin v. Republic explained:

We hold that the use of a meter stick without the corresponding seal of the Internal Revenue Office by one who has been engaged in business for a long time, involves moral turpitude because it involves a fraudulent use of a meter stick, not necessarily because the Government is cheated of the revenue involved in the sealing of the meter stick, but because it manifests an evil intent on the part of the petitioner to defraud customers purchasing from him in respect to the measurement of the goods purchased.

Then, in 1975, in the case In Re Lanuevo, We declared that it is for the Supreme Court to determine what crime involves moral turpitude. This became the foundation of the jurisprudential doctrine holding that whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute.

Over the years, We adjudged the following as crimes involving moral turpitude:

1. Abduction with consent
2. Bigamy
3. Concubinage
4. Smuggling
5. Rape
6. Estafa through falsification of a document
7. Attempted Bribery
8. Profiteering
9. Robbery
10. Murder, whether consummated or attempted
11. Estafa
12. Theft
13. Illicit Sexual Relations with a Fellow Worker
14. Violation of BP Blg. 22
15. Falsification of Document
16. Intriguing against Honor
17. Violation of the Anti-Fencing Law
18. Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Drug-pushing)
19. Perjury
20. Forgery
21. Direct Bribery
22. Frustrated Homicide
23. Adultery
24. Arson
25. Evasion of income tax
26. Barratry
27. Blackmail
28. Criminal conspiracy to smuggle opium
29. Dueling
30. Embezzlement
31. Extortion
32. Forgery
33. Libel
34. Making fraudulent proof of loss on insurance contract
35. Mutilation of public records
36. Fabrication of evidence
37. Offenses against pension laws
38. Seduction under the promise of marriage
39. Falsification of public document
40. Estafa thru falsification of public document

Indeed, in Zari v. Flores, We said that tax evasion is a crime involving moral turpitude. On whether an act or omission constitutes tax evasion, We certainly agree that it depends on the totality of circumstances. As such, it must be clarified that failure to file income tax return does not always amount to tax evasion. Tax evasion connotes fraud through the use of pretenses and forbidden devices to lessen or defeat taxes. The fraud contemplated by law is actual and not constructive. It must be intentional fraud, consisting of deception willfully and deliberately done or resorted to in order to induce another to give up some legal right. Negligence, whether slight or gross, is not equivalent to the fraud with intent to evade the tax contemplated by law. It must amount to intentional wrong-doing with the sole object of avoiding the tax. Furthermore, tax evasion connotes the integration of three factors: (a) the end to be achieved, i.e., the payment of less than that known by the taxpayer to be legally due, or the non-payment of tax when it is shown that a tax is due; (b) an accompanying state of mind, which is described as being "evil," in "bad faith," "willful," or "deliberate and not accidental"; and (c) a course of action or failure of action that is unlawful.

On the other hand, failure to file income tax return may be committed by neglect, without any fraudulent intent and/or willfulness. In fact, under Section 248 of the 1997 NIRC, the law treats "failure to file any return" differently from "willful neglect to file the return." The former is meted with a surcharge of 25%, while the latter, 50%. The 50% rate is referred to as the fraud penalty. Previously, under Section 72 of the 1939 NIRC, a taxpayer may be excused from the 25% surcharge if the taxpayer subsequently files the return despite absence of BIR notice and the earlier failure is due to a reasonable cause. Section 248 of the 1997 NIRC and Section 72 of the 1939 NIRC respectively state:

Sec. 248. Civil Penalties. -

(A) There shall be imposed, in addition to the tax required to be paid, a penalty equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of the amount due, in the following cases:

(1) Failure to file any return and pay the tax due thereon as required under the provisions of this Code or rules and regulations on the date prescribed; or

(2) Unless otherwise authorized by the Commissioner, filing a return with an internal revenue officer other than those with whom the return is required to be filed; or

(3) Failure to pay the deficiency tax within the time prescribed for its payment in the notice of assessment; or

(4) Failure to pay the full or part of the amount of tax shown on any return required to be filed under the provisions of this Code or rules and regulations, or the full amount of tax due for which no return is required to be filed, on or before the date prescribed for its payment.

(B) In case of willful neglect to file the return within the period prescribed by this Code or by rules and regulations, or in case a false or fraudulent return is willfully made, the penalty to be imposed shall be fifty percent (50%) of the tax or of the deficiency tax, in case, any payment has been made on the basis of such return before the discovery of the falsity or fraud: Provided, That a substantial under-declaration of taxable sales, receipts or income, or a substantial overstatement of deductions, as determined by the Commissioner pursuant to the rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary of Finance, shall constitute prima facie evidence of a false or fraudulent return: Provided, further, That failure to report sales, receipts or income in an amount exceeding thirty percent (30%) of that declared per return, and a claim of deductions in an amount exceeding (30%) of actual deductions, shall render the taxpayer liable for substantial under-declaration of sales, receipts or income or for overstatement of deductions, as mentioned herein.

Sec. 72. Surcharges for Failure to Render Returns and for Rendering False and Fraudulent Returns. — The Collector of Internal Revenue shall assess all income taxes. In case of willful neglect to file the return or list within the time prescribed by law, or in case a false or fraudulent return or list is willfully made, the Collector of Internal Revenue shall add to the tax or to the deficiency tax, in case any payment has been made on the basis of such return before the discovery of the falsity or fraud, or surcharge of fifty per centum of the amount of such tax or deficiency tax. In case of any failure to make and file a return or list within the time prescribed by law or by the Collector or other internal-revenue officer, not due to willful neglect, the Collector of Internal Revenue shall add to tax twenty-five per centum of its amount, except that, when a return is voluntarily and without notice from the Collector or other officer filed after such time, and it is shown that the failure to file it was due to a reasonable cause, no such addition shall be made to the tax. The amount so added to any tax shall be collected at the same time and in the same manner as part of the tax unless the tax has been paid before the discovery of the neglect, falsity, or fraud, in which case the amount so added shall be collected in the same manner as the tax. (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

The foregoing discussion illustrates that omission to file a tax return is not fraudulent per se.

As Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier eloquently declared, taken in its proper context, the failure to file a compensation income tax return is far from being "everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general."

Although petitioners suggest that We reexamine the totality of circumstances surrounding respondent Marcos, Jr.'s non-filing of an income tax return, We deem it unnecessary to go through the same exercise because of this Court's Decision involving the same facts. In Republic v. Marcos II, We already declared that respondent Marcos Jr.'s non-filing of an income tax return is not a crime involving moral turpitude, viz:

The 'failure to file an income tax return' is not a crime involving moral turpitude as the mere omission is already a violation regardless of the fraudulent intent or willfulness of the individual. This conclusion is supported by the provisions of the NIRC as well as previous Court decisions which show that with regard to the filing of an income tax return, the NIRC considers three distinct violations: (1) a false return, (2) a fraudulent return with intent to evade tax, and (3) failure to file a return.

The same is illustrated in Section 51(b) of the NIRC which reads:

(b) Assessment and payment of deficiency tax – xxx

In case a person fails to make and file a return or list at the time prescribed by law, or makes willfully or otherwise, false or fraudulent return or list x x x.

Likewise, in Aznar v. Court of Tax Appeals, this Court observed:

To our minds we can dispense with these controversial arguments on facts, although we do not deny that the findings of facts by the Court of Tax Appeals, supported as they are by very substantial evidence, carry great weight, by resorting to a proper interpretation of Section 332 of the NIRC. We believe that the proper and reasonable interpretation of said provision should be that in the three different cases of (1) false return, (2) fraudulent return with intent to evade tax, (3) failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be begun without assessment; at any time within ten years after the discovery of the (1) falsity, (2) fraud, and (3) omission. Our stand that the law should be interpreted to mean a separation of the three different situations of false return, fraudulent return with intent to evade tax, and failure to file a return is strengthened immeasurably by the last portion of the provision which segregates the situations into three different classes, namely, "falsify;" "fraud" and "omission."

Applying the foregoing considerations to the case at bar, the filing of a 'fraudulent return with intent to evade tax' is a crime involving moral turpitude as it entails willfulness and fraudulent intent on the part of the individual. The same, however, cannot be said for 'failure to file a return' where the mere omission already constitutes a violation. Thus, this Court holds that even if the conviction of respondent Marcos II is affirmed, the same not being a crime involving moral turpitude cannot serve as a ground for his disqualification. (Emphases supplied.)

Significantly, Republic v. Marcos II involved the same Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 18569 and considered the same act of non-filing of income tax returns at issue in the present Petitions. We held in the said case that respondent Marcos Jr. is not disqualified from being an executor of his father's will since the crime of failure to file income tax returns does not involve moral turpitude. Thus, consistent with our earlier pronouncement, respondent Marcos, Jr.'s failure to file income tax returns does not involve moral turpitude.

The foregoing militates against the notion that non-filing of income tax return by an individual taxpayer receiving purely compensation income involves moral turpitude, or is against good morals and accepted rule of conduct. It is not in itself immoral, and neither does it constitute an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general. Thus, We sustain the COMELEC's ruling that the omission of respondent Marcos Jr. to file income tax returns does not involve moral turpitude.

As We sustain COMELEC's ruling, We, however, address and state Our disagreement with the argument that the omission to file income tax returns does not involve moral turpitude because the offense has already been decriminalized by RA 10963, otherwise known as the Tax Reform for Acceleration and Inclusion (TRAIN) Law.

At this juncture, We clarify that non-filing of income tax returns has not been decriminalized under the 1997 NIRC and its subsequent amendments. Rather, what our current tax laws introduced are classifications of taxpayers who are not required to file an income tax return and who may file a tax return under the substituted filing system.

This clarification starts with a distinction between taxpayers who are not required to file income tax returns from taxpayers who file tax returns under the substituted filing system. Under Section 51(A)(2) of the 1997 NIRC, as amended, a minimum wage earner is exempt from income tax and is not required to file an income tax return. On the other hand, an individual earning purely compensation income from a single employer whose income tax has been correctly withheld by said employer is not required to file an annual income tax return. Over the years, the BIR recognized the need to simplify the filing of individual income tax returns. It introduced the substituted filing system in Revenue Regulations (R.R.) No. 3-2002, which was further amended by R.R. No. 19-2002. Substituted filing took effect in taxable year 2001 and was made mandatory starting the taxable year 2002.

The substituted filing system made it easier for pure compensation earners to file their income tax returns because the relevant information is more accessible to their employers. In substituted filing, the employer's annual return for the employee is considered as the employee's income tax return because they contain identical information. Employers, or other persons who are required to deduct and withhold the tax on compensation, furnish their employees with a Certificate of Income Tax Withheld on Compensation, or BIR Form No. 2316. After the issuance of a joint certification by the employer and the employee, the employee who is qualified for substituted filing is no longer required to file an Annual Income Tax Return, or BIR Form No. 1700.

"Substituted filing" was distinguished from "non-filing" of income tax returns in Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 1-2003. RMC No. 1-2003 further clarified the provisions of R.R. No. 3-2002, as amended by R.R. No. 19-2002.

Under "substituted filing", an individual taxpayer although required under the law to file his income tax return, will no longer have to personally file his own income tax return but instead the employer's annual information return filed will be considered as the "substitute" income tax return of the employee inasmuch as the information in the employer's return is exactly the same information in the employee's return.

"Non-filing" is applicable to taxpayers who are not required under the law to file an income tax return. An example is an employee whose pure compensation income does not exceed P60,000, and has only one employer for the taxable year and whose tax withheld is equivalent to his tax due.

The substituted filing system did not dispense with the requirement of filing income tax returns for pure compensation earners. Neither did it exempt qualified taxpayers from filing income tax returns as required by Section 51 of the 1997 NIRC.

Prior to the enactment of the TRAIN Law in 2017, an individual whose pure compensation income is derived from sources within the Philippines exceeds P60,000.00 is still mandated to file an income tax return. Hence, even if an individual taxpayer is qualified to avail of the substituted filing of income tax return, he or she is still not excused from filing an income tax return. The TRAIN Law, in amending the 1997 NIRC, added a new section, 51-A, to incorporate the substituted filing system established by BIR practice into law.

Sec. 51-A. Substituted Filing of Income Tax Returns by Employees Receiving Purely Compensation Income. – Individual taxpayers receiving purely compensation income, regardless of amount, from only one employer in the Philippines for the calendar year, the income tax of which has been withheld correctly by the said employer (tax due equals tax withheld) shall not be required to file an annual income tax return. The certificate of withholding filed by the respective employers, duly stamped 'received' by the BIR, shall be tantamount to the substituted filing of income tax returns by said employees.

Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao states that, in adopting the system of substituted filing under Section 51-A of the 1997 Tax Code, as amended by the TRAIN Law, Congress did not decriminalize the non-filing of income tax returns. It merely ordained, for the convenience of individual taxpayers, a practice already established and observed by the BIR. What is clear, however, is that the non-filing of income tax returns by those who have not duly met the requirements and conditions may still be penalized under both the 1997 NIRC and the TRAIN Law.

In any event, as discussed above, the COMELEC concluded that respondent Marcos, Jr.'s failure to file income tax returns does not constitute a crime involving moral turpitude. And We affirm the COMELEC's conclusion.
 

The RTC convicted respondent Marcos, Jr. and meted out the penalty of imprisonment and fine. However, the CA modified this ruling and limited the penalty to the payment of fine.

In arguing that Section 12 of the OEC should still apply to disqualify respondent Marcos, Jr., petitioners Ilagan, et al. asserted before the COMELEC that the CA Decision is void for failing to follow the penalty provided under Section 254 of the 1977 NIRC, which expressly imposes the penalty of both imprisonment and a fine.

Further, petitioners Ilagan, et al. insist that, even if the CA did not err in deleting the penalty of imprisonment in resolving the case against respondent Marcos, Jr., he is still perpetually disqualified on the basis of the unequivocal language of PD 1994, which amended the 1977 NIRC. They argue that a mandatory accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification is imposed by PD 1994 in addition to the penalties provided under the 1977 NIRC. For their part, petitioners Buenafe, et al. assert that the consequence of perpetual disqualification applies to all convictions of crimes under the NIRC, regardless of the imposed penalty.

We agree with the COMELEC, that the introduction of the penalty of both imprisonment and fine in Section 254 only became effective in 1998 when the 1997 NIRC was passed. Consequently, this cannot be retroactively applied to the prejudice of respondent Marcos, Jr., who was convicted for failure to file the required tax returns for the years 1982 to 1985. Well-settled is the rule that penal laws cannot be given retroactive effect, unless favorable to the accused.

Following the doctrine on immutability of judgments, the CA Decision has long attained finality and can no longer be modified in any respect. Nevertheless, We deem it necessary to restate and clarify which laws apply to the different violations.

For respondent Marcos, Jr's. failure to file income tax returns for the years 1982 to 1984, what should apply instead is Section 73 of the 1977 NIRC, which states:

Sec. 73. Penalty for failure to file return or to pay tax. — Any one liable to pay the tax, to make a return or to supply information required under this Code, who refuses or neglects to pay such tax, to make such return or to supply such information at the time or times herein specified in each year, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two thousand pesos or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or both. xxx (Emphasis supplied.)

On the other hand, PD 1994 is the applicable law for respondent Marcos, Jr.'s failure to file his 1985 income tax return. Section 288 of said law imposes the penalty of a fine or imprisonment or both:

Sec. 288. Failure to file return, supply information, pay tax, withhold and remit tax. - Any person required under this Code or by regulations promulgated thereunder to pay any tax, make a return, keep any records, or supply any information, who willfully fails to pay such tax, make such return, keep such records, or supply such information, or withhold or remit taxes withheld, at the time or times required by law or regulations, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, upon conviction thereof, be fined not less than five thousand pesos nor more than fifty thousand pesos, or imprisoned for not less than six months and one day but not more than five years, or both.

Any person who attempts to make it appear for any reason that he or another has in fact filed are turn or statement, or actually files a return or statement and subsequently withdraws the same return or statement after securing the official receiving seal or stamp of receipt of an internal revenue office wherein the same was actually filed shall, upon conviction therefor be fined not less than three thousand pesos or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both. (Emphasis supplied.)

Clearly the CA had the discretion to impose the penalty of a fine or imprisonment or both, upon respondent Marcos, Jr. The CA's Decision imposing only the penalty of a fine is valid: Consequently, respondent Marcos, Jr. cannot be disqualified on the ground that he was sentenced by final judgment to a penalty of more than eighteen months under Section 12 of the OEC.

Similarly, as will be expounded later on, We agree with the COMELEC's finding that respondent Marcos Jr. was not imposed with the penalty of perpetual disqualification from running for public office.

The said accessory penalty was not originally provided for in the 1977 NIRC, as this was only imposed upon the effectivity of PD 1994 in 01 January 1986. Hence, again, respondent Marcos, Jr. may be imposed with the accessory penalty only for his failure to file his income tax return for the year 1985.

However, a perusal of the dispositive portion of the CA Decision would reveal that the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification was not imposed on respondent Marcos, Jr. Evidently, this CA Decision has long attained finality, and can no longer be touched upon by this Court. To alter the same would be extremely prejudicial to respondent Marcos, Jr., and would create a precedent contrary to the basic principle that all doubts should be construed against the State and in favor of the accused.
 

Respondent Marcos, Jr. raises the argument that petitioners Buenafe, et al. violated Section 1, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended, which states:

Sec. 1. Ground for Denial or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy. –

xxx

A Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy invoking grounds other than those stated above or grounds for disqualification, or combining grounds for a separate remedy, shall be summarily dismissed.

Petitioners Buenafe, et al. counter that their petition before the COMELEC did not violate the cited provision since it only raised grounds relating to the falsity of the material representation of eligibility in respondent Marcos, Jr.'s COC. Thus, the COMELEC erred in ruling that their petition was susceptible to summary dismissal for invoking grounds for disqualification.

For their part, respondent Marcos, Jr. and the COMELEC claim that the petition may be summarily dismissed for raising grounds for disqualification, such as respondent Marcos, Jr.'s conviction for an offense involving moral turpitude and a crime that carries the penalty of imprisonment of more than eighteen (18) months.

However, these arguments are neither decisive of, nor relevant to, the present controversy. The COMELEC did not dismiss the petition on the ground of violating Section 1, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Instead, it proceeded to rule on the substantive issues raised and denied the petition for lack of merit. The pertinent portion of the COMELEC Second Division's Resolution dated 17 January 2022 reads:

Despite summary dismissal being warranted in the case at bar, We shall nevertheless relax compliance with the technical rules of procedure and proceed to discuss the merits if only to fully and finally settle the matter in this case because of its paramount importance.

The COMELEC En Banc further noted that "despite the finding that the Petition may be summarily dismissed for noncompliance with the requirements under the law, the Commission (Second Division) relaxed compliance with technical rules and proceeded to discuss the merits of the case." Given that, there is no need to belabor the procedural correctness of petitioners Buenafe, et al.'s submissions before the COMELEC. Whether petitioners Buenafe, et al. raised arguments more appropriate for a petition for disqualification is now irrelevant to this Court's resolution of the present petitions.

Moreover, the Court has ruled that, even without a petition under Section 78 of the OEC, "the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction." Thus, even procedural defects in petitioners Buenafe at al.'s COMELEC petition will not save respondent Marcos, Jr.'s COC from scrutiny.

In passing upon the merits of these petitions, We are mindful that the scope of Our review in a petition for certiorari is limited. Pursuant to Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Rules of Court, petitioners Buenafe, et al. must show that the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Grave abuse of discretion generally refers to a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." Thus, mere abuse of discretion is not enough. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." Unless it is firmly established that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion, We would not interfere with its decision. Findings of fact of the COMELEC, when supported by substantial evidence, shall be final and non-reviewable.

We find no grave abuse of discretion in this case. The COMELEC's ruling is amply supported by law, jurisprudence, and the evidence on record.

As previously mentioned, Sections 74 and 78 of the OEC govern the cancellation of, or denial of due course to, COCs on the ground of false material representation. Under Section 74, a person filing a COC must state therein that "he is eligible for said office," among other information. On the other hand, Section 78 expressly provides that the denial of due course or cancellation of a COC may be filed exclusively on the ground that the information the candidate provided under Section 74 is false.

Notably, not every false representation warrants the denial of due course to or cancellation of a COC. It must be shown that the false representation pertained to material information and was made with an "intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications for public office." Thus, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not, in and of itself, justify the cancellation of his or her COC. The requisites of materiality and intent must be present.
 

Section 78 does not specify the parameters of a "material representation." Nonetheless, this Court has had numerous occasions in the past to expound on the concept.

In Villafuerte v. COMELEC, We held that, for a representation to be material, it must "refer to an eligibility or qualification for the elective office the candidate seeks to hold." Thus, facts pertaining to a candidate's residency, age, citizenship, or any other legal qualification are considered material under Section 78 of the OEC.

Further, in Salcedo II v. COMELEC, the Court explained the rationale behind the requirement of materiality, and concluded that the law should not be interpreted to cover innocuous mistakes:

Therefore, it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation contemplated by section 78 of the Code refer to qualifications for elective office. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a false representation in his [or her] certificate of candidacy are grave — to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him [or her] for violation of the election laws. It could not have been the intention of the law to deprive a person of such a basic and substantive political right to be voted for a public office upon just any innocuous mistake. (Citation omitted.)

In this case, petitioners Buenafe, et al. assert that respondent Marcos, Jr. made a false material representation when, in his COC, he certified under oath the statement, "I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to." Respondent Marcos, Jr. also allegedly misrepresented his eligibility when he checked the box "No" in response to the question, "[h]ave you ever been found liable for an offense which carries with it the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office, which has become final and executory?" Petitioners Buenafe, et al. claim that respondent Marcos, Jr.'s conviction for violation of the NIRC carried with it the penalty of perpetual disqualification, thereby rendering the two statements false.

The assailed representations pass the test of materiality because they pertain to respondent. Marcos, Jr.'s eligibility to hold elective office. In Dimapilis v. COMELEC (Dimapilis), We ruled that perpetual disqualification is a material fact because it directly affects a person's capacity to be elected and to hold public office, thus:

A CoC is a formal requirement for eligibility to public office. Section 74 of the OEC provides that the CoC of the person filing it shall state, among others, that he is eligible for the office he seeks to run, and that the facts stated therein are true to the best of his knowledge. To be "eligible" relates to the capacity of holding, as well as that of being elected to an office. Conversely, "ineligibility" has been defined as a "disqualification or legal incapacity to be elected to an office or appointed to a particular position." In this relation, a person intending to run for public office must not only possess the required qualifications for the position for which he or she intends to run, but must also possess none of the grounds for disqualification under the law.

In this case, petitioner had been found guilty of Grave Misconduct by a final judgment, and punished with dismissal from service with all its accessory penalties, including perpetual disqualification from holding public office. Verily, perpetual disqualification to hold public office is a material fact involving eligibility which rendered petitioner's CoC void from the start since he was not eligible to run for any public office at the time he filed the same. (Emphases and underscoring in the original; citations omitted.)

When respondent Marcos, Jr. declared that he has not been convicted of an offense that carries with it the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold office, he made a material representation regarding his eligibility to run for and hold elective office. This representation, if proved false, would fall within the ambit of Section 78 of the OEC.

Similarly, respondent Marcos, Jr. made a material representation when he signed and subscribed to his COC, which states that, "I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to." In Aratea v. COMELEC (Aratea), the Court emphasized that disqualification to run for office is an ineligibility. Consequently, a statement in the COC that one is eligible, when such is not the case, is a false material representation constituting ground for the application of Section 78 of the OEC:

Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which means that the convict is not eligible to run for public office, contrary to the statement that Section 74 requires him to state under oath in his certificate of candidacy. As this Court held in Fermin v. Commission on Elections, the false material representation may refer to "qualifications or eligibility." One who suffers from perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to run for public office. If a person suffering from perpetual special disqualification files a certificate of candidacy stating under oath that "he is eligible to run for (public) office," as expressly required under Section 74, then he clearly makes a false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. As this Court explained in Fermin:

Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate. (Emphasis and italics in the original; citations omitted.)

The Court came to the same conclusion in the cases of Ty-Delgado, cited earlier, and Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC (Jalosjos, Jr.). In these cases, the Court ruled that petitioners therein, who had filed their respective COCs, made false material representations when they declared themselves eligible to hold public office, despite prior convictions that rendered them ineligible.

Dimapilis involved a candidate found guilty by a final judgment of the administrative offense of Grave Misconduct. Meanwhile, in Aratea, Jalosjos, Jr. and Ty-Delgado, the candidates seeking to run for public office had criminal convictions under the RPC. None of these cited cases pertains to a conviction under the NIRC, specifically the application of Section 286, as amended by PD 1994.

Nonetheless, We find no reason to depart from these cases' ruling on the effect of perpetual disqualification to hold public office on a person's representation of eligibility in his or her COC. Accordingly, We hold that the assailed representations in this case are material for the purpose of applying Section 78 of the OEC.

Respondent Marcos, Jr. claims that his alleged perpetual disqualification to hold public office does not bear on his eligibility because it does not pertain to any of the requirements under Section 2, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.^[295] He argues that these requirements are exclusive.^[296] Hence, in determining his eligibility to run for President, only the requirements under this constitutional provision must be considered, to the exclusion of any other grounds for disqualification under other laws.^[297]

The Court has ruled that, as used in Section 74 of the OEC, the word "eligible" means having "the right to run for elective public office, that is, having all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for the public office."^[298] Perpetual disqualification is an ineligibility. Necessarily, therefore, it directly affects one's eligibility to run for office. Equally established is that the enumeration of qualifications in the 1987 Constitution, as reiterated in Section 63 of the OEC, is not exclusive. Other pertinent laws lay down requirements for qualification and eligibility to run for and hold elective office. These considerations are sufficient to meet the requirement of materiality under Section 78 of the OEC.

Having established that the subject representations are material, We now resolve whether they are false, i.e., whether respondent Marcos, Jr. misrepresented himself to be eligible and not disqualified from running as president. Relevant to its resolution is whether respondent Marcos, Jr. was indeed perpetually disqualified from holding public office in light of the CA Decision.
 

The concept of disqualification from public office has been present in Philippine laws for more than a century. It figured several times in the various Acts enacted by the First Philippine Commission between 1900 to 1907. Under Act No. 5, disloyalty to the U.S. as the supreme authority in the Islands was declared a ground for complete disqualification for holding office in the Philippine civil service.

Act No. 1126 empowered the Civil Governor not only to remove any municipal officer from office, but also, in his discretion, declare such official either temporarily or permanently disqualified thereafter from holding office.

Moreover, Act No. 1582, or the Election Law of 1907, which governed the country's very first national elections through popular votes, provided that "xxx no person who has been convicted of a crime which is punishable by imprisonment for two years or more shall hold any public office, and no person disqualified from holding public office by the sentence of a court xxx shall be eligible to hold public office during the term of his disqualification." Prior to this, persons who meet the minimum age, residence and literacy requirements can become municipal officers, unless they are ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries from provincial, departmental, or governmental funds, contractors for public works of the municipality, or someone who habitually smokes, chews, swallows, injects, or otherwise consumes or uses opium in any of its forms.

In addition, Act No. 1582 provided for a penalty of disqualification from any public office, for a period of five years upon certain officials who shall "aid any candidate or influence in any manner or take any part in any municipal, provincial, or Assembly election."

Under Section 11 of Act No. 1450; which amended Act No. 136, the penalty of disqualification from holding office may also be meted by the Governor General upon justices of the peace found "not performing his duties properly" or "unfit for the service." A person may also be disqualified from running from office by reason of the non-payment of taxes, which disqualification can be removed by paying the delinquent taxes after election and before the date fixed by law for assuming office, but not afterwards. Persons convicted of offenses connected with administration of the then Bureau of Audits (such as embezzlement or malversation in office) were likewise "ipso facto forever disqualified from holding any public office or employment of any nature whatever within the Philippine Islands."

Further back in history, disqualification from public office was already recognized as a penalty even before the American occupation. The Penal Code for the Philippine Islands (old Penal Code), which was promulgated in 1884 under the Spanish Constitution,^[313] state in pertinent part:

Art. 31. The penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification shall produce the following effects:

1. The deprivation of all honors and of any public offices and employments which the offender may have held, even if conferred by popular election.

2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office.

3. The disqualification for any honor, office, or public employment, and for the exercise of any of the rights mentioned.

4. The loss of all right to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held, but without prejudice to any allowance for living expenses which the Government may see fit to grant the defendant for any distinguished service.

The provisions of this article shall not affect any rights acquired at the time of the conviction by the widow or children of the offender.

Art. 32. The penalty of temporary absolute disqualification shall produce the following effects:

1. The deprivation of all honors and of any public offices and employments which the offender may have held, even if conferred by popular election.

2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office, during the term of the sentence.

3. The disqualification for any of the honors, employments, offices, and rights mentioned in paragraph one hereof, during the term of the sentence.

Art. 33. The penalty of perpetual special disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects:

1. The deprivation of the office or employment thereby affected and of the honors thereto appertaining.

2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments.

Art. 34. The penalty of perpetual special disqualification for the right of suffrage shall forever deprive the offender of the right to vote at any election for the public office in question or to be elected to such office.

Art. 35. The penalty of temporary special disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects:

1. The deprivation of the office or employment in question and of all honors appurtenant thereto.

2. The disqualification for holding any similar office during the term of the sentence.

Art. 36. The penalty of temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender, during the term of the sentence, of the right to vote in any election for the office to which the sentence refers or to be elected to such office. (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

It was then considered both an afflictive and accessory penalty. As a stand-alone penalty, disqualification from public office can be imposed for a duration of six years and one day to twelve years. On the other hand, when imposed as an accessory to other penalties, its duration was as provided by law.

In 1930, the old Penal Code was repealed by Act No. 3815, or the RPC. Although the provisions relating to disqualification from public office were essentially retained, there were still notable changes: first, from six separate Articles under the old Penal Code, the provisions on disqualification were thereafter compressed into two provisions, which now read:

Art. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. - The penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects:

1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held even if conferred by popular election.

2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular office or to be elected to such office.

3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any of the rights mentioned.

In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article shall last during the term of the sentence.

4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held.

Art. 32. Effect of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. - The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification. (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

The Court, in Lacuna v. Abes, clarified the distinction between the different kinds of disqualification as distilled in these two provisions:

The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the convict for public office and for the right to vote, such disqualification to last only during the term of the sentence xxx

But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. This accessory penalty deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually, as distinguished from temporary special disqualification, which lasts during the term of the sentence. xxx

xxx

The word "perpetually" and the phrase "during the term of the sentence" should be applied distributively to their respective antecedents; thus, the word "perpetually" refers to the perpetual kind of special disqualification, while the phrase "during the term of the sentence" refers to the temporary special disqualification. The duration between the perpetual and the temporary (both special) are necessarily different because the provision, instead of merging their durations into one period, states that such duration is "according to the nature of said penalty" – which means according to whether the penalty is the perpetual or the temporary special disqualification.

Second, in addition to being classified as an accessory penalty, the penalty of disqualification from public office is also specifically imposed by the RPC as a penalty for the commission of the following crimes:

a. Knowingly rendering unjust judgment (Art. 204);
a. Judgment rendered through negligence (Art. 205);
b. Direct bribery (Art. 210);
c. Other frauds (Art. 214);
d. Malversation of public funds or property (Art. 217);
e. Illegal use of public funds or property (Art. 220);
f. Conniving with or consenting to evasion (Art. 223);
g. Evasion through negligence (Art. 224);
h. Removal, concealment or destruction of documents (Art. 226);
i. Officer breaking seal (Art. 227);
j. Opening of closed documents (Art. 228);
k. Revelation of secrets by an officer (Art. 229);
l. Open disobedience (Art. 231);
m. Disobedience to Order of Superior Officer, when said order was suspended by inferior officer (Art. 232);
n. Refusal of Assistance (Art. 233);
o. Maltreatment of Prisoners (Art. 235);
p. Prolonging performance of duties and powers (Art. 237);
q. Usurpation of Legislative Powers (Art. 239);
r. Disobeying request for disqualification (Art. 242);
s. Abuses against chastity (Art. 245);
t. Corruption of minors (Art. 340);
u. Liability of ascendants, guardians, teachers, or other persons entrusted with the custody of the corrupted/abused minor (Art. 346);
v. Simulation of births, substitution of one child for another and concealment or abandonment of a legitimate child (Art. 347).

Third, under the old Penal Code, accessory penalties must be explicitly imposed. Thus, in People v. Perez, this Court held:

The first question that presents itself for consideration is whether or not by virtue of the judgment imposing two years, four months and one day of prision correccional upon the accused in the aforesaid criminal case for assault against a person in authority, the appellant became disqualified from assuming said office of municipal president.

If we confine ourselves to the field of the Penal Code now in force, our answer would be in the negative for two reasons: First, because in said judgment, whose disposing part is set out hereinabove, he is not expressly sentenced to be disqualified, which disqualification would have been an accessory penalty in the form of suspension from office and from the right of suffrage during the life of the sentence, according to article 61 of the Penal Code. Article 90 of this Code provides that the accessory penalties are to be imposed upon the convict expressly, and, according to Viada, they are not to be presumed to have been imposed xxx

In contrast, Article 73 of the RPC categorically provided for a presumption regarding the automatic imposition of accessory penalties, thus:

Art. 73. Presumption in Regard to the Imposition of Accessory Penalties. — Whenever the courts shall impose a penalty which, by provision of law, carries with it other penalties, according to the provisions of articles 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, and 45 of this Code, it must be understood that the accessory penalties are also imposed upon the convict. (Emphases supplied.)

To be sure, disqualification from public office has also been provided as a principal penalty for the commission of crimes identified and defined under special laws. These include, among others:

Disqualification from public office may also be imposed as a penalty in administrative cases. Section 51 of the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, for example, specifically provides that the grave administrative offense of fixing and/or collusion with fixers in consideration of economic and/or other gain or advantage shall be penalized by dismissal and perpetual disqualification from public service.

Generally, however, perpetual disqualification from holding public office is among the disabilities considered inherent in, and follows as a consequence of, the penalty of dismissal. Such penalties are, in turn, imposed for the commission of acts constituting grave misconduct, that is, misconduct attended by any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or disregard of established rules:

xxx This gravity means that misconduct was committed with such depravity that it justifies not only putting an end to an individual's current engagement as a public servant, but also the foreclosure of any further opportunity at occupying public office.

xxx

One who commits grave misconduct is one who, by the mere fact of that misconduct, has proven himself or herself unworthy of the continuing confidence of the public. By his or her very commission of that grave offense, the offender forfeits any right to hold public office.

Petitioners Ilagan, et al. maintain that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it declared that respondent Marcos, Jr. was not disqualified from running for public office for the following reasons:

(1) PD 1994 clearly and unequivocally imposed a mandatory penalty of perpetual disqualification as an accessory penalty on top of the penalties provided by the 1977 NIRC;

(2) respondent Marcos, Jr. was a public official until 1986 and there was no abandonment of office that would justify his failure to file the required income tax returns;

(3) the CA Decision imposing only the penalty of fine is void as it completely ignored a mandatory directive to impose the maximum penalty prescribed; as well as the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office;

(4) in any case, since respondent Marcos, Jr. never filed the required income tax returns, he is, to date, considered to be in continued violation of the NIRC.

As the foregoing issues are interrelated, this Court shall address them jointly.

Section 45 of the 1977 NIRC required every Filipino citizen having a gross annual income of at least P1,800.00, whether residing in the Philippines or abroad, to file an income tax return on or before the fifteenth day of March of each year, covering income of the preceding taxable year. Failure to so file was originally punished, under Section 73, by "a fine of not more than two thousand pesos or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or both."

On 05 November 1985, PD 1994 was issued, introducing substantial amendments to the 1977 NIRC. These amendments included Section 286, to wit:

Sec. 286. General provisions. —

(a) Any person convicted of a crime penalized by this Code shall, in addition to being liable for the payment of the tax, be subject to the penalties imposed herein: Provided, That payment of the tax due after apprehension shall not constitute a valid defense in any prosecution for violation of any provision of this Code or in any action for the forfeiture of untaxed articles.

(b) Any person who willfully aids or abets in the commission of a crime penalized herein or who causes the commission of any such offense by another, shall be liable in the same manner as the principal.

(c) If the offender is not a citizen of the Philippines, he shall be deported immediately after serving the sentence without further proceedings for deportation. If he is a public officer or employee, the maximum penalty prescribed for the offense shall be imposed and, in addition, he shall be dismissed from the public service and perpetually disqualified from holding any public office, to vote and to participate in any election. If the offender is a certified public accountant, his certificate as a certified public account shall, upon conviction, be automatically revoked or canceled.

(d) In the case of associations, partnerships, or corporations, the penalty shall be imposed on the partner, president, general manager, branch manager, treasurer, officer-in-charge, and employees responsible for the violation. (Emphases supplied.)

We agree with petitioners Ilagan, et al. that Section 286 clearly provides for the imposition of disqualification from public office as a penalty upon public officials or employees found guilty of violating the provisions of the 1977 NIRC, as amended by PD 1994. It is, however, not disputed that the fallo of the CA Decision adjudging respondent Marcos, Jr.'s guilt for non-filing of the required income tax return makes absolutely no mention of said penalty. We again quote the dispositive portion for emphasis:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

1. ACQUITTING the accused-appellant of the charges of violation of Section 50 of the NIRC for non-payment of deficiency taxes for the taxable years 1982 to 1985 in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-29216, Q-92-29215, Q-92-29214 and Q-92-24390; and FINDING him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 45 of the NIRC for failure to file income tax returns for the taxable years 1982 to 1985 in Criminal Cases No. Q-91-24391, Q-92-29212, Q-92-29213 and Q-92-29217;

1. Ordering the appellant to pay to the BIR the deficiency income taxes due with interest at the legal rate until fully paid;
2. Ordering the appellant to pay a fine of P2,000.00 for each charge in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-29213, Q-92-29212 and Q-92-29217 for failure to file income tax returns for the years 1982, 1983 and 1984; and the fine of P30,000.00 in Criminal Case No. Q-91-24391 for failure to file income tax return for 1985, with surcharges.

SO ORDERED."

Petitioners Ilagan, et.al. advance the view that the imposition of disqualification from public office as an accessory penalty is mandatory and that, since courts have no power to impose a lower penalty than what is authorized by law, the CA Decision is void as it "completely ignored the mandatory directive of Section 286 of PD 1994."

However, it must be emphasized that in criminal cases, the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action is the State. The interest of the private offended party, if any, is restricted only to the civil liability. Thus, in Yokohama Tire Philippines, Inc. v. Reyes, We sustained the dismissal of the petition for the annulment of a decision of acquittal on the ground that the same would "necessarily require a review of the criminal aspect of the case and, as such, is prohibited. xxx [O]nly the State, and not herein petitioner, who is the private offended party, may question the criminal aspect of the case."

The offense of non-filing of income tax returns does not conceivably implicate any private interests, much less those pertaining to petitioners Ilagan, et al. As in malversation of public funds or property, tax evasion, or violations of RA 3019, the government is the offended party that sustained actual and direct injury as a result of the commission of the offense in question and the one entitled to the civil liabilities, if any, of the accused. On this score alone, petitioner Ilagan, et al.'s contentions should be rejected.
 
Even granting ex gratia argumenti standing in petitioners Ilagan, et al.'s favor, the CA Decision has long become final and executory as in fact Entry of Judgment was issued more than twenty (20) years ago, on 31 August 2001. It can no longer be modified, even by this Court.

Finally, in Estarija v. People, We upheld the erroneous penalty imposed by the RTC upon Estarija for violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019. The trial court imposed upon Estarija a straight penalty of seven years, without any accessory penalty. The correct penalty under the law, with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Act, would have been imprisonment ranging from six years and one month, as minimum, to nine years as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from public office. However, the decision of the RTC had already become final and executory because Estarija mistakenly appealed his conviction with the CA instead of the Sandiganbayan. In resolving the case, We held:

[The RTC Decision] may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law; and whether or not made by the highest court of the land. The reason is grounded on the fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgments or orders of courts must be final at some definite date fixed by law.

The RTC imposed upon Estarija the straight penalty of seven (7) years. This is erroneous. The penalty for violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019 is imprisonment for not less than six years and one month nor more than fifteen years, and perpetual disqualification from public office. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is punished by a special law, the Court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law, and the minimum term shall not be less than the minimum prescribed by the same. Thus, the correct penalty should have been imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) month, as minimum, to nine (9) years as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from public office. However, since the decision of the RTC has long become final and executory, this Court cannot modify the same. (Emphasis supplied.)

In another case, Tan v. People, We set aside the amendatory judgment of the trial court increasing the penalty imposed on petitioner for bigamy after it had already pronounced judgment, on the basis of which petitioner had applied for probation, foreclosing his right to appeal and rendering the previous verdict to lapse into finality. Thus, even if the trial court erred in the penalty imposed, the decision can no longer be amended after it has attained finality.

This is not to say, however, that there was, in fact, error or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA when it saw fit to modify the conclusions reached, and penalties imposed, by the trial court.

In the landmark case of People v. Simon, We have already settled the matter of treatment of penalties found in special laws and the RPC:

xxx [W]here the penalties under the special law are different from and are without reference or relation to those under the Revised Penal Code, there can be no suppletory effect of the rules for the application of penalties under said Code or by other relevant statutory provisions based on or applicable only to said rules for felonies under the Code. In this type of special law, the legislative intendment is clear.

The same exclusionary rule would apply to the last given example, Republic Act No. 5639. While it is true that the penalty of 14 years and 8 months to 17 years and 4 months is virtually equivalent to the duration of the medium period of reclusion temporal, such technical term under the Revised Penal Code is not given to that penalty for carnapping. Besides, the other penalties for carnapping attended by the qualifying circumstances stated in the law do not correspond to those in the Code. The rules on penalties in the Code, therefore, cannot suppletorily apply to Republic Act No. 6539 and special laws of the same formulation.

On the other hand, the rules for the application of penalties and the correlative effects thereof under the Revised Penal Code, as well as other statutory enactments founded upon and applicable to such provisions of the Code, have suppletory effect to the penalties under the former Republic Act No. 1700 and those now provided under Presidential Decrees Nos. 1612 and 1866. While these are special laws, the fact that the penalties for offenses thereunder are those provided for in the Revised Penal Code lucidly reveals the statutory intent to give the related provisions on penalties for felonies under the Code the corresponding application to said special laws, in the absence of any express or implicit proscription in these special laws. To hold otherwise would be to sanction an indefensible judicial truncation of an integrated system of penalties under the Code and its allied legislation, which could never have been the intendment of Congress. (Emphases supplied.)

Here, petitioners Ilagan et al.'s theory that perpetual disqualification was automatically imposed with the mere fact of conviction finds basis from jurisprudence involving disqualifications under the RPC. Respondent Marcos, Jr.'s conviction, on the other hand, is for the non-filing of income tax return under the 1977 NIRC. Whereas the RPC contained a system of penalties categorized between principal or accessory penalties, as well as an express presumption in regard to the imposition of certain penalties upon the mere fact of conviction, the 1977 NIRC did not.

People v. Silvallana, the case cited by petitioners Ilagan, et al. to support their argument that the accessory penalty need not be written in the judgment of conviction, clearly states that the presumption on the automatic imposition of accessory penalties applies only to Articles 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, and 45 of the RPC, in relation to Article 73 thereof. In that case, We explained:

The defendant must suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification, not because article 217 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in all cases persons guilty of malversation shall suffer perpetual disqualification in addition to the principal penalty, but as a consequence of the penalty of prision mayor provided in article 171. In accordance with article 42 of the Revised Penal Code the penalty of prision mayor carries with it that of temporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, and article 32 provides that during the period of his disqualification the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office. Moreover, article 73 of the Revised Penal Code provides that whenever the courts shall impose a penalty which, by provision of law, carries with it other penalties, according to the provisions of articles 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, and 45 of the Revised Penal Code, it must be understood that the accessory penalties are also imposed upon the convict. It is therefore unnecessary to express the accessory penalties in the sentence. (Emphasis supplied.)

Further, a more careful reading of Section 286 would also show details that militate against petitioners Ilagan, et al.'s reading of automatic imposition of the penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office. We refer to the following portion of Section 286:

[c] If the offender is not a citizen of the Philippines, he shall be deported immediately after serving the sentence without further proceedings for deportation. lf he is a public officer or employee, the maximum penalty prescribed for the offense shall be imposed and, in addition, he shall be dismissed from the public service and perpetually disqualified from holding any public office, to vote and to participate in any election. If the offender is a certified public accountant his certificate as a certified public account shall upon conviction, be automatically revoked or canceled. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

As correctly pointed out by respondent Marcos, Jr., while Section 286(c) specifies that the revocation or cancellation of a certified public accountant's certificate is automatic upon conviction, the same is not true with respect to the imposition of the penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office. If indeed the legislative intent is such that a public officer or employee found guilty of violating the provisions of the 1977 NIRC is automatically perpetually disqualified from holding public office, then the law could have so easily stated. It, however, did not do so.

In dubiis reus est absolvendus — all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused. This Court thus holds that, unless explicitly provided for in the fallo, the penalty of disqualification from public office under Section 286(c) is not deemed automatically imposed on a public officer or employee found to have violated the provisions of the 1977 NIRC. We find this interpretation to be more in keeping with the intention of the legislators, as well as being more favorable to the accused.

Applying the same principle, petitioners Ilagan, et al.'s claim of a continuing violation on the part of respondent Marcos, Jr. also lacks merit. There is nothing in either the 1977 NIRC or PD 1994 that speaks of the continuing nature of the offense of non-filing of income tax returns. In fact, in case a person fails to make and file a return at the time prescribed by law, the law allows the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to make the return from his own knowledge and from such information as he can obtain through testimony or otherwise. Such return shall be prima facie good and sufficient for all legal purposes, unless the taxpayer can prove the contrary under proper proceedings. 
 

We reiterate that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused. Indeed, penal statutes are strictly construed against the State and all doubts are to be resolved liberally in favor of the accused. Additionally, We stress that execution must always conform to that decreed in the dispositive part of the decision, because the only portion thereof that may be subject of execution is that which is precisely ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion.

Further, it is axiomatic that final and executory judgments can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land. To be sure, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable in accordance with the principle of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is intended to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law and whether it may have been made by the court that rendered it or by the Supreme Court itself. Any act that violates this principle must be immediately struck down.

We emphasize that the CA Decision has long attained finality. A plain reading of the said decision would reveal that the penalty was limited to the imposition of the payment of fines, and respondent Marcos, Jr. was neither sentenced to imprisonment nor meted the penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office. Verily, this Court cannot add to, nor modify, the penalties imposed therein. Moreover, as discussed above, respondent Marcos, Jr.'s failure to file an income tax return is not an offense involving moral turpitude.

At any rate, respondent Marcos, Jr. has already paid the deficiency taxes and fines imposed in the CA Decision.

To prove payment of the deficiency taxes and fines, respondent Marcos, Jr. presented a BIR Certification and a Landbank Official Receipt dated 27 December 2001.

This notwithstanding, petitioners Ilagan, et al. assert that these are insufficient to prove satisfaction of the deficiency taxes and fines, as an order of payment must first come from the court before payment may be made. Further, they argue that nowhere in the BIR Certification does it state that the payments were made in satisfaction of the imposed penalties rendered by the court. To support their submissions, petitioners Ilagan, et al. presented a Certification issued by the RTC stating that there is no record on file of: (1) compliance of payment or satisfaction of its Decision dated 27 July 1995 or the CA Decision dated 31 October 1997; and (2) entry in the criminal docket of the RTC Decision dated 27 July 1995 as affirmed/modified by the CA Decision.

On the other hand, the COMELEC Former First Division found as sufficient the BIR Certification and a Landbank Official Receipt presented by respondent Marcos, Jr. Specifically as regards the Landbank Official Receipt, the COMELEC Former First Division concluded that the payment was indeed for the deficiency taxes and fees as evidenced by the amounts indicated therein, and the writing of the number "0605." It was explained that BIR Form 0605 is a payment form used by taxpayers to pay taxes and fees that do not require a tax return, including deficiency taxes. Moreover, the COMELEC Former First Division considered that the breakdown of amounts indicated in the Landbank Official Receipt already includes the payment of fines ordered to be paid by the CA. Consequently, it ruled that respondent Marcos, Jr. has already paid the deficiency taxes and fines in the total amount of P67,137.27, in compliance with the CA Decision.

We agree with the COMELEC.

It bears stressing that BIR Form 0605 is accomplished every time a taxpayer pays taxes and fees that do not require the use of a tax return such as second installment payment for income tax, deficiency tax, delinquency tax, registration fees, penalties, advance payments, deposits, and installment payments, among others. The same has also been considered by the Court as proof of payment of deficiency taxes. We likewise reiterate that the best evidence for proving payment is by evidence of receipts showing the same. Thus, We agree that respondent Marcos, Jr. has indeed submitted sufficient evidence to prove the payment of the deficiency taxes and fines imposed upon him.

In contrast, the RTC Certification presented by petitioners Ilagan, et al. is insufficient to establish that respondent Marcos, Jr. did not pay the deficiency taxes and fines because it merely establishes that there is no record on file showing compliance with the RTC and the CA Decisions. Basic is the rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it by means other than mere allegations. Here, petitioners Ilagan, et al. failed to substantiate their allegations through this mere RTC Certification, especially when weighed against the evidence presented by respondent Marcos, Jr.

On this note, We stress that the 1977 NIRC provides that the failure to file return or to pay tax shall be punished by a fine or by imprisonment or both. There is therefore no merit to the allegation that the CA, by limiting the penalty to the payment of fines in its Decision, failed to correctly apply the provisions of the law effective at the time of the offense. The CA imposed a penalty that is within the range of penalties provided by law. Thus, it is erroneous to say that respondent Marcos, Jr. has yet to serve his penalty. Respondent Marcos, Jr. has already paid the deficiency taxes and fines imposed upon him.

Pertinently, it bears noting that respondent Marcos, Jr. was a government employee for the years 1982 to 1985. The COMELEC Former First Division considered the Certification issued by the Local Finance Committee of the Province of Ilocos, which stated that taxes were withheld from his compensation received for the years 1982 to 1985. There is basis to conclude that any deficiency taxes due from his compensation should be attributable to the provincial government as the withholding agent, and not to respondent Marcos, Jr.

In any case, non-payment of fines is not a ground for disqualification under Section 12 of the OEC, which contemplates only three instances when a person may be disqualified to hold public office, thus:

1. Declared by competent authority insane or incompetent; or

2. Sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months; or

3. Sentenced by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude.

Verily, whether or not respondent Marcos, Jr. satisfied the payment of fines and penalties with the lower courts is immaterial since his sentence did not fall within the purview of Section 12 of the OEC.

V. Conclusion

"In free republics, it is most peculiarly the case: In these, the will of the people makes the essential principle of the government; and the laws which control the community, receive their tone and spirit from the public wishes."

Vox populi, vox Dei – In the 09 May 2022 elections, over half of the electorate chose to stake the fate of the entire nation on respondent Marcos, Jr. Only time can unravel the wisdom behind the overwhelming support given to him. In the meantime, no one can argue that the electoral exercise is an essential part of our democracy.

Equally important to the life of our Republic is the acknowledgement that it is founded upon the rule of law. Thus, even the will of the majority cannot subvert what the law has made obligatory. Candidates are expected to abide by the procedural and substantive requirements for running for public office.

As such, inquiring upon a candidate's qualifications and compliance is not just a right but a responsibility of every citizen. Petitioners Buenafe, et al. and petitioners Ilagan, et al. have exercised such responsibility which, in turn, brought these cases to light. In resolving these Petitions, the Court also made its own determination not only as part of its constitutional duty, but in its role as a pillar of our democracy.

This Decision was never intended to validate the 31,629,783 who expressed their faith on respondent Marcos, Jr. Instead, this Decision aims to confirm the eligibility and qualifications of respondent Marcos, Jr. for the highest position of the land. After much scrutiny, We come to the conclusion that our laws do not support the position taken by petitioners Buenafe, et al., who declared that respondent Marcos, Jr. made false material representations as to his eligibility, nor the assertions of petitioners Ilagan, et al., who put doubt on respondent Marcos, Jr.'s qualifications by alleging that he is perpetually disqualified from running from public office and convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

Indeed, the exercise of this Court's power to decide the present controversy has led to no other conclusion but that respondent Marcos, Jr. is qualified to run for and be elected to public office. Likewise, his COC, being valid and in accord with the pertinent laws, was rightfully upheld by the COMELEC.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426 are hereby DISMISSED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 21-156 (DC) dated 17 January 2022 and 10 May 2022, and in SPA No. 21-212 (DC) dated 10 February 2022 and 10 May 2022 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo, C.J., Hernando, Rosario, and Marquez, JJ., concur.
Leonen, SAJ., see separate concurring opinion.
Caguioa, J., on official leave but left his vote. See separate opinion.
Lazaro-Javier, J., with concurrence.
Inting,^* J., no part.
M. Lopez, J., please see separate concurring opinion.
Gaerlan, J., please see separate concurring opinion.
J. Lopez, J., with separate concurring.
Dimaampao, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Kho, Jr.,^** J., no part.
Singh, J., see separate concurring opinion.

Question and Answers

1. What is the difference between a petition to deny due course to or cancel a COC and a petition for disqualification?

Suggested Answer: A petition to deny due course to or cancel a COC is governed by Section 78 of the OEC and is distinct from a petition for disqualification, which may be filed pursuant to Sections 12 or 68 of the OEC. While both petitions aim to prevent a candidate from running for office, they have different grounds and effects.

2. What are the grounds for disqualification under Section 12 of the OEC?

Suggested Answer: The grounds for disqualification under Section 12 of the OEC include being declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or having been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which the penalty imposed is more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude.

3. Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the petitions questioning respondent Marcos, Jr.'s eligibility to run for President?

Suggested Answer: Yes, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the petitions. The Court's jurisdiction is not limited by the Constitution, and it can take cognizance of the petitions as they raise fundamental questions regarding respondent Marcos, Jr.'s eligibility.

4. Is respondent Marcos, Jr.'s failure to file income tax returns considered a crime involving moral turpitude?

Suggested Answer: No, respondent Marcos, Jr.'s failure to file income tax returns is not considered a crime involving moral turpitude. The concept of moral turpitude implies an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity, and failure to file income tax returns may be due to neglect or other reasons not necessarily involving moral turpitude.

5. What is the effect of respondent Marcos, Jr.'s conviction for non-filing of income tax returns on his eligibility to run for President?

Suggested Answer: Respondent Marcos, Jr.'s conviction for non-filing of income tax returns does not affect his eligibility to run for President. The penalty imposed on him was only a fine, and he has already paid the deficiency taxes and fines.

6. Can a petition to deny due course to or cancel a COC be filed against a candidate who has been proclaimed winner?

Suggested Answer: Yes, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a COC can still be filed against a candidate who has been proclaimed winner, as long as the conditions for the filing of petitions before the PET have not been met.

7. What are the conditions for the filing of petitions before the PET?

Suggested Answer: The conditions for the filing of petitions before the PET are: (1) a petition is filed before it; and (2) the petition is filed against a Presidential or Vice-Presidential candidate who has been validly proclaimed, properly taken his or her oath, and assumed office.

8. Is the PET a separate and distinct body from the Supreme Court?

Suggested Answer: No, the PET is not a separate and distinct body from the Supreme Court. The PET is a function of the Supreme Court En Banc, and when the Court acts as the PET, it is not a separate and distinct body from the Court itself.

9. What is the significance of the concept of "material representation" in a petition to deny due course to or cancel a COC?

Suggested Answer: A material representation refers to a statement in the COC that pertains to a candidate's eligibility or qualification for the office they seek. If the representation is false, it can be a ground for denying due course to or canceling the COC.

10. Can a candidate's COC be canceled or denied due course if they have been convicted of a crime that does not involve moral turpitude?

Suggested Answer: A candidate's COC can be canceled or denied due course if they have made a false material representation in their COC, regardless of whether the conviction involves moral turpitude or not.

11. What is the effect of a candidate's failure to serve their sentence on their eligibility to run for office?

Suggested Answer: A candidate's failure to serve their sentence may not necessarily affect their eligibility to run for office, especially if the penalty imposed was only a fine and they have already paid it.

12. Can a petition to deny due course to or cancel a COC be dismissed if it raises grounds for disqualification?

Suggested Answer: A petition to deny due course to or cancel a COC may not be dismissed solely because it raises grounds for disqualification, as the COMELEC has a duty to rule on the substantive issues raised.

13. What is the standard of review in a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court?

Suggested Answer: The standard of review in a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 is whether the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

14. Can the Supreme Court modify a final and executory judgment in a criminal case?

Suggested Answer: No, the Supreme Court cannot modify a final and executory judgment in a criminal case, even if the modification is intended to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.

15. What is the significance of the concept of "immutability of judgments" in the context of final and executory judgments?

Suggested Answer: The concept of "immutability of judgments" means that final and executory judgments cannot be modified or altered in any respect, even by the highest court of the land. This principle ensures that judgments are final and binding, and prevents endless litigation.

16. Can a candidate's eligibility to run for office be affected by a conviction that is not final and executory?

Suggested Answer: A candidate's eligibility to run for office may not be affected by a conviction that is not final and executory, as the conviction may still be subject to appeal or review.

17. What is the effect of a candidate's payment of deficiency taxes and fines on their eligibility to run for office?

Suggested Answer: A candidate's payment of deficiency taxes and fines may be considered as compliance with the penalty imposed, and may not affect their eligibility to run for office.

18. Can a petition to deny due course to or cancel a COC be filed based on a candidate's alleged false representation of eligibility?

Suggested Answer: Yes, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a COC can be filed based on a candidate's alleged false representation of eligibility, if the representation pertains to a material fact that affects their eligibility to run for office.

19. What is the role of the COMELEC in resolving petitions to deny due course to or cancel a COC?

Suggested Answer: The COMELEC has the duty to resolve petitions to deny due course to or cancel a COC based on the grounds raised, and to determine whether the candidate has made a false material representation in their COC.

20. Can the Supreme Court's decision in a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 be considered as a validation of a candidate's overwhelming support in the elections?

Suggested Answer: No, the Supreme Court's decision in a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 is not a validation of a candidate's overwhelming support in the elections, but rather a determination of the candidate's eligibility and qualifications based on the law and evidence presented.