Law Reviewer

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Powers of Administrative Agencies

  1. Quasi-legislative power / Power of subordinate legislation
  2. Quasi-judicial power/Power of adjudication
  3. Determinative powers (Note: Senator Neptali Gonzales calls them incidental powers)

Definition of “Quasi-legislative power”

It is the authority delegated by the law-making body to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of a law and implement legislative policy.

Distinctions between Quasi-legislative power and legislative power

  1. LEGISLATIVE power involves the discretion to determine whatthe law shall be.  QUASI-legislative power only involves the discretion to determine howthe law shall be enforced.
  2. LEGISLATIVE power CANNOT be delegated.  QUASI-legislative power CAN be delegated.

Tests of Delegation (applies to the power to promulgate administrative regulations )

  1. COMPLETENESS test. This means that the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature so that when it reaches the delegate, it will have nothing to do but to enforce it.
  2. SUFFICIENT STANDARD test. The law must offer a sufficient standard to specify the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and specify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.

Definition of Quasi-Judicial Power

It is the power of administrative authorities to make determinations of facts in the performance of their official duties and to apply the law as they construe it to the facts so found. The exercise of this power is only incidental to the main function of administrative authorities, which is the enforcement of the law.

Determinative Powers

1. ENABLING powers 

Those that PERMIT the doing of an act which the law undertakes to regulate and would be unlawful without government approval.

Ex.  Issuance of licenses to engage in a particular business.

2.DIRECTING powers

Those that involve the corrective powers of public utility commissions, powers of assessment under the revenue laws, reparations under public utility laws, and awards under workmen’s compensation laws, and powers of abstract determination such as definition-valuation, classification and fact finding

3. DISPENSING powers

Exemplified by the authority to exempt from or relax a general prohibition, or authority to relieve from an affirmative duty. Its difference from licensing power is that dispensing power sanctions a deviation from a standard.

4. SUMMARY powers

Those that apply compulsion or force against person or property to effectuate a legal purpose without a judicial warrant to authorize such action. Usually without notice and hearing.

Ex. Abatement of nuisance, summary destraint, levy of property of delinquent tax payers

5. EQUITABLE powers

Those that pertain to the power to determine the law upon a particular state of facts. It refers to the right to, and must, consider and make proper application of the rules of equity.

Ex. Power to appoint a receiver, power to issue injunctions

Kinds of Administrative Regulations

DISTINCTIONS

LEGISLATIVE

INTERPRETATIVE

1. Capacity that administrative agency is acting in

Legislative

Judicial

2. What administrative agency is doing

It supplements the statute by filling in the details

It says what the statute means

3. Force and effect

Legislative regulations have the force and effecr of law immediately upon going into effect. Such is accorded by the courts or by express provision of statute.

Merely persuasive/Received by the courts with much respect but not accorded with finality

Requisites of a Valid Administrative Regulation

  1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature.
  2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature.
  3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure.
  4. It must be reasonable

Need for Previous Notice and Hearing

  1. General Rule: Administrative rules of GENERAL application do NOT require previous notice and hearing.
  2. Exception: When the legislature itself requires it and mandates that the regulation shall be based on certain facts as determined at an appropriate investigation.
  3. If the regulation is in effect a settlement of a controversy between specific parties, it is considered an administrative adjudication, requiring notice and hearing.

Prescribing of Rates

It can be either:

1. LEGISLATIVE

If the rules/rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country.

No prior notice and hearing is required.

2. QUASI-JUDICIAL

If the rules and rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact. Prior notice and hearing is required.

Requirement of Publication

Administrative Regulations that MUST be published:

  1. Administrative regulations of GENERAL application.
  2. Administrative regulations which are PENAL in nature.

Administrative regulations that do NOT NEED to be PUBLISHED:

  1. Interpretative regulations
  2. Internal rules and regulations governing the personnel of the administrative agency.
  3. Letters of instruction issued by administrative superiors concerning guidelines to be followed by their subordinates.  (Tanada v. Tuvera)

Special Requisites of a Valid Administrative Regulation with a PENAL sanction

  1. The law itself must make violation of the administrative regulation punishable.
  2. The law itself must impose and specify the penalty for the violation of the regulation.
  3. The regulation must be published.

Requisites for Proper Exercise of Quasi-Judicial Power

  1. Jurisdiction
  2. Due process

Administrative Due Process : Requirements

  1. Right to Notice, be it actual or constructive
  2. Reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights and to introduce witnesses
  3. Impartial tribunal with competent jurisdiction
  4. Finding or decision supported by substantial evidence

Exceptions to the Notice and Hearing Requirement

  1. Urgency of immediate action
  2. Tentativeness of the administrative action
  3. Right was previously offered but not claimed
  4. Summary abatement of a nuisance per se
  5. Preventive suspension of a public servant facing administrative charges
  6. Padlocking of filthy restaurants/theaters showing obscene movies
  7. Cancellation of a passport of a person sought for criminal prosecution
  8. Summary distraint and levy of properties of a delinquent taxpayer
  9. Replacement of a temporary or acting appointee

Questions Reviewable on Judicial Review:

1. Questions of FACT

The general rule is that courts will not disturb the findings of administrative agencies acting within the parameters of their own competence so long as such findings are supported by substantial evidence. By reason of their special knowledge, expertise, and experience, the courts ordinarily accord respect if not finality to factual findings of administrative tribunals.

2. Question of  LAW

Administrative decision may be appealed to the courts independently of legislative permission.

It may be appealed even against legislative prohibition because the judiciary cannot be deprived of its inherent power to review all decisions on questions of law.

 Doctrine of Finality

Courts are reluctant to interfere with action of an administrative agency prior to its completion or finality, the reason being that absent a final order or decision, power has not been fully and finally exercised, and there can usually be no irreparable harm.

EXCEPTIONS:  Interlocutory order affecting the merits of a controversy; Preserve status quo pending further action by the administrative agency; Essential to the protection of the rights asserted from the injury threatened; Officer assumes to act in violation of the Constitution and other laws; Order not reviewable in any other way; Order made in excess of power

Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

  1. This doctrine states that courts cannot or will not determine a controversy which requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters of intricate questions of fact are involved.
  2. Relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the court even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court.

Doctrine of Prior Resort

When a claim originally cognizable in the courts involves issues which, under a regulatory scheme are within the special competence of an administrative agency, judicial proceedings will be suspended pending the referral of these issues to the administrative body for its view.

Note:  The doctrines of primary jurisdiction and prior resort have been considered to be interchangeable.

Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

  1. Under this doctrine, an administrative decision must first be appealed to the administrative superiors up to the highest level before it may be elevated to a court of justice for review.
  2. Reasons :
    1. to  enable  the  administrative  superiors  to  correct  the  errors  committed  by  their  subordinates.
    2. courts  should  refrain  from  disturbing  the  findings of  administrative. bodies  in  deference  to  the  doctrine  of  separation  of  powers.
    3. courts  should not  be saddled  with  the  review of  administrative  cases
    4. judicial  review  of  administrative cases is usually effected  through  special civil  actions which are available  only  if  their  is  no other  plain,  speedy and  adequate  remedy.

3.  Exceptions

a.  when  the question  raised is  purely  legal, involves constitutional questions

b.   when the administrative body is in estopped

c.   when act complained of is patently illegal

d.   when there is urgent need for judicial intervention

e.   when claim involved is small

f.    when irreparable  damage is involved

g.   when there is no other plain, speedy , adequate remedy

h.   when strong public interest is involved

I.    when the subject of controversy is private land

  1. in quo warrantoproceedings
  2. When the administrative remedy is permissive, concurrent
  3. utter disregard of due process
  4. long-continued and unreasonable delay
  5. amount involved is relatively small
  6. when no administrative review is provided
  7. respondent is a department secretary (DOCTRINE  OF QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENCY – ALTER EGO DOCTRINE)

Substantial evidence – defined to mean not necessarily preponderant proof as required in ordinary civil cases but such kind of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

Political Law Part XV: Article XVIII – Transitory Provisions

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Political Law Part XV: Article XVIII – Transitory Provisions

POLITICAL LAW PART XV

ARTICLE XVIII – TRANSITORY PROVISIONS

1.  Sections 1-27

 2. PCGG Cases

Read:

a. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 200 SCRA 530

     a.-1 BATAAN SHIPYARD AND ENGINEERING COMPANY VS. PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, May 27, 1987, 150 SCRA 181

     b.   RICARDO SILVERIO VS. PCGG, G.R. No. 77645, Oct. 26, 1987,155 SCRA 60

     c.   KWONG, et al vs. PCGG, G.R. No. 79484, December 7, 1987,156 SCRA 222

     d.   PALM AVENUE REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION           VS. PCGG, G.R. No. 76296, August 31, 1987,153           SCRA 579

     e.   LIWAYWAY PUBLISHING, INC. VS. PCGG, April 15, 1988,160 SCRA

     f.   PCGG VS. PENA, 159 SCRA 556

     g.   Executive Order No. 275

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Political Law Part XIV: Article XVI – General Provisions

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Political Law Part XIV: Article XVI – General Provisions

POLITICAL LAW PART XIV

ARTICLE XVI – GENERAL PROVISIONS

1.  Sections 1-12

Exec. Order No. 264

a.   Consent is either Express or Implied

b.   Express

1.   general law

aa.  C.A. 327

bb.  Act 3083, Sec. 1

cc.  Art. 2180 par. 6, New Civil Code (R.A. 386)

dd.  PD 1807, January 16, 1981

2.   Special law

Read:     MERRITT VS. GOVERNMENT, 34 Phil. 311

c.   Implied

1.   When the government institutes a suit;

State immunity from suit; when government officers initiate a suit against a private party, it descends to the level of a private individual susceptible to counterclaims

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN and ROBERTO BENEDICTO, 484 SCRA 119

Garcia, J.

When the State through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) filed a complaint against a private individual before the Sandiganbayan and thereafter, enters into a compromise agreement , it cannot later on invoke immunity from suit.

Where the State itself is no less than the plaintiff in the main case, immunity from suit cannot be invoked because when a state, through its duly authorized officers takes the initiative in a suit against a private party, it thereby descends to the level of a private individual and thus opens itself to whatever counterclaims or defenses the latter may have against it. When the State enters into contract, through its officers or agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim or purpose and pursuant to a constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual and reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise therefrom, the State may be sued even without its express consent, precisely because by entering into a contract the sovereign descends to the level of the citizen. Its consent to be sued is implied from the very act of entering into such contract, breach of which on its part gives the corresponding right of the other party to the agreement.

2.   When the government engages in business or enters into a contract; and

3.   Read:

aa.  MINISTERIO VS. CFI of Cebu, 40 SCRA                bb.  U.S. VS. RUIZ, 136 SCRA

               cc.  TORIO VS. FONTANILLA, 85 SCRA 599

               dd.  COMMISSIONER VS. SAN DIEGO, 31 SCRA 616

   ee. USA vs. JUDGE QUINTO, et al., February 26, 1990 and the cases                         cited therein

              ff. Republic of the Philippines vs. Judge Sandoval, March 19, 1993

             gg. Wylie vs. Rarang, 209 SCRA 357

             hh. Veteans vs. CA, 214 SCRA 286

Immunity from suit; effect of a void contract with the government; unjust enrichment

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH VS. C.V. CANCHELA, et al., 475 SCRA 218

Carpio-Morales, J.

Facts:

The DOH entered into  three owner –consultant agreements with the private  respondents covering infrastructure projects for the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center (BGHMC), the Batangas Regional Hospital and the Corazon L. Montelibano Memorial regional Hospital in Bacolod City.

The agreements for the three (3) projects are almost identical. This requires the private respondents to prepare: detailed architectural and engineering design plans; technical specifications and detailed estimates of cost of construction of the hospital, including the preparation of bid documents and requirements; and construction supervision until completion of hand-over and issuance of final certificate.

While the Agreements were witnessed by the respective Chief Accountants of the hospitals and were duly approved by the Department of Health, the former did not issue corresponding certificates of availability of funds to cover the professional or consultancy fees.

The DOH through is authorized representative, wrote separate letters to the respective chiefs of hospitals confirming the acceptance of private respondents’ complete Contract or Bid Documents for each project and RECOMMENDED THE PAYMENT OF 7.5% OF THE PROJECT ALLOCATION TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AS CONSULTANCY FEES.

During the construction of the projects, various deficiencies in the performance of the agreed scope of private respondents’ work were allegedly discovered which were not communicated to the private respondents. Due to such alleged deficiencies, petitioner withheld payment of the consultancy fees due to private respondent. Neither did petitioner return the documents, plans, specifications and estimates submitted by private respondents.

Considering the refusal of the DOH to pay said fees despite repeated demands, the private respondents submitted the dispute to the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC).

After the presentation of evidence by both parties, the Arbitrator issued his decision dated March 30, 1999 sentencing the DOH to pay the private respondents to pay P3,492,713.00 for services performed and completed for and accepted by DOH. The said amount shall earn interest at 6% per annum from the date of the award until the decision becomes final. Thereafter, the principal and the interest accrued as of such time shall earn interest  at 12% per annum.

The DOH filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 before the Court of Appeals but was dismissed for being filed out of time. As such, on motion of the private respondents, the Arbitrator issued a Writ of Execution .

I s s u e :

Whether or not the CIAC has jurisdiction to entertain the suit considering that the Agreements, being to promote the heath and well-being of the citizens, is in furtherance of  the state’s sovereign and governmental power and therefore, IMMUNE FROM SUIT.

Held:

In their Memorandum before the Supreme Court, the DOH, for the first time, raised the nullity of the three (3) agreements from the very beginning for failure to include therein a certification of availability of funds which is required under existing laws, particularly the Auditing Code of the Philippines, PD 1445.  As such, the fees of the private respondents shall not be based on the project fund allocation but on the basis of reasonable value or on the principle of quantum meruit.

While the agreement is indeed void ab initio for violation of existing laws, the DOH is liable to pay the private respondents  their consultancy services based on quantum merit to be determined by the Commission on Audit.

The invocation of immunity from suit is without merit. This is so because the government has already received and accepted the benefits rendered. To refuse payment as a result of the state’s immunity from suit would be to allow the government to unjustly enrich itself at the expense of another. (Citing Eslao vs. COA, 195 SCRA 730)

4.   Tests of Suability for incorporated government

Read:

aa.  RAYO VS. CFI OF BULACAN, 110 SCRA 456

bb.  ANGAT RIVER IRRIGATION SYSTEM VS. CIR, 102 Phil. 789

5.   Tests of Suability for an unincorporated govt. agency government agency

Read:

aa.  NATIONAL AIRPORTS CORP. VS. TEODORO, 91 Phil 203

               bb.  SANTIAGO VS. REPUBLIC, 87 SCRA 294

               cc.  PNB VS. PABALAN, 83 SCRA595

               dd.  REPUBLIC VS. PURISIMA, 78 SCRA 470

               ee.  MOBIL PHIL. VS. CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE, 185 SCRA 1120

               ff.  BUREAU OF PRINTING VS. BUREAU OF                     PRINTING EMPLOYEES  ASSOCIATION, 1                     SCRA 340

               hh.  METRAN VS. PAREDES, 79 Phil. 819

               ii.  SANTOS VS. SANTOS, 92 Phil. 281

               jj.  MALAYAN INSURANCE VS. SMITH BELL, Nov. 17, 1980

               kk.  SYQUIA VS. ALMEDA LOPEZ, 84 Phil. 31

               ll.  LIM VS. BROWNELL, JR., 107 Phil. 344

               mm.  CARABAO INC. VS. SPC, 35 SCRA 224

nn.        U.S.A. vs. RUIZ, 136 SCRA 487

LOIDA Q. SHAUF and JACOB SHAUF  vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DON E. DETWILER and ANTHONY, G.R. No. 90314        November 27, 1990

Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of the United States Air Force, applied for the vacant position of Guidance Counselor, GS 1710-9, in the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base, for which she is eminently qualified. As found by the trial court, she received a Master of Arts degree from the University of Sto. Tomas, Manila, in 1971 and has completed 34 semester hours in psychology-guidance and 25 quarter hours in human behavioral science; she has also completed all course work in human behavior and counseling psychology for a doctoral degree; she is a civil service eligible; and, more importantly, she had functioned as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Air Base at the GS 1710-9 level for approximately four years at the time she applied for the same position in 1976.

Contrary to her expectations, petitioner Loida Q. Shauf was never appointed to the position occupied by Mrs. Abalateo whose appointment was extended indefinitely by private respondent Detwiler.

Feeling aggrieved by what she considered a shabby treatment accorded her, petitioner Loida Q. Shauf wrote the U.S. Civil Service Commission questioning the qualifications of Edward Isakson. Thereafter, said commission sent a communication addressed to private respondent Detwiler, 10 finding Edward Isakson not qualified to the position of Guidance Counselor, GS 1710-9, and requesting that action be taken to remove him from the position and that efforts be made to place him in a position for which he qualifies. Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf avers that said recommendation was ignored by private respondent Detwiler and that Isakson continued to occupy said position of guidance counselor.

Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf likewise wrote the Base Commander of Clark Air Base requesting a hearing on her complaint for discrimination. Consequently, a hearing was held on March 29, 1978 before the U.S. Department of Air Force in Clark Air Base.

Before the Department of Air Force could render a decision, petitioner Loida Q. Shauf filed a complaint for damages, dated April 27, 1978, against private respondents Don Detwiler and Anthony Persi before the Regional Trial Court, Branch LVI at Angeles City, docketed as Civil Case No. 2783, for the alleged discriminatory acts of herein private respondents in maliciously denying her application for the GS 1710-9 position.

Private respondents, as defendants in Civil Case No. 2783, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that as officers of the United States Armed Forces performing official functions in accordance with the powers vested in them under the Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement, they are immune from suit. The motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

Petitioners aver that private respondents are being sued in their private capacity for discriminatory acts performed beyond their authority, hence the instant action is not a suit against the United States Government which would require its consent.

Private respondents, on the other hand, claim that in filing the case, petitioners sought a judicial review by a Philippine court of the official actuations of respondents as officials of a military unit of the U.S. Air Force stationed at Clark Air Base. The acts complained of were done by respondents while administering the civil service laws of the United States. The acts sued upon being a governmental activity of respondents, the complaint is barred by the immunity of the United States, as a foreign sovereign, from suit without its consent and by the immunity of the officials of the United States Armed Forces for acts committed in the performance of their official functions pursuant to the grant to the United States Armed Forces of rights, power and authority within the bases under the Military Bases Agreement. It is further contended that the rule allowing suits against public officers and employees for unauthorized acts, torts and criminal acts is a rule of domestic law, not of international law. It applies to cases involving the relations between private suitors and their government or state, not the relations between one government and another from which springs the doctrine of immunity of a foreign sovereign.

The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under Article 11, Section 2. This latter provision merely reiterates a policy earlier embodied in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and also intended to manifest our resolve to abide by the rules of the international community.

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only sects against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded.  It must be noted, however, that the rule is not so all-encompassing as to be applicable under all circumstances.

It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen etc., et al.  “Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates crime invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent.  The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.

They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.

The agents and officials of the United States armed forces stationed in Clark Air Base are no exception to this rule. In the case of United States of America, et al. vs. Guinto, etc., et al., ante  we declared:

It bears stressing at this point that the above observations do not confer on the United States of America blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country merely because they have acted as agents of the United States in the discharge of their official functions.

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Political Law Part XIII: Article XIV – Education, Science, etc.

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Political Law Part XIII: Article XIV – Education, Science, etc.

POLITICAL LAW PART XIII

ARTICLE XIV – EDUCATION, SCIENCE, ETC.

 1.  Secs. 1-19

a. Read: RA 6655-The Free Secondary Education Act         of 1988

Section 5 [2] Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.

b.   What is academic freedom?

Very Important: (2007 Bar Question)

Under the 1973 Constitution, “Academic freedom shall by enjoyed BY ALL institutions of higher learning”  while under the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “Academic freedom shall be enjoyed IN ALL institutions of higher learning.” In short, before, ON LY INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING ENJOY ACADEMIC FREEDOM WHILE UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IS ALSO ENJOYED BY THE TEACHERS AND PROFESSORS AS WELL AS STUDENTS, ASIDE FROM THE SCHOOL.

Academic freedom; due process in disciplinary actions involving students

DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY VS. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.WILFREDO D. REYES, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 36, Regional Trial Court of Manila, THECOMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE ANDSPORTS, ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, RICHARD REVERENTE and ROBERTOVALDES, JR., G.R. No. 127980,  December 19, 2007

REYES, R.T., J.:

THE FACTS:

PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled by the De La Salle University (DLSU) and College of Saint Benilde (CSB)[1][1] Joint Discipline Board because of their involvement in an offensive action causing injuries to petitioner James Yap and three other student members of Domino Lux Fraternity.

On  March 29, 1995,   James Yap was eating his dinner alone in Manang’s Restaurant near La Salle, when he overheard two men bad-mouthing and apparently angry at Domino Lux.  He ignored the comments of the two. When he arrived at his boarding house, he mentioned the remarks to his two other brods while watching television. These two brods had earlier finished eating their dinner at Manang’s. Then, the three, together with four other persons went back to Manang’s and confronted the two who were still in the restaurant.  By admission of respondent Bungubung in his testimony, one of the two was a member of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity.  There was no rumble or physical violence then.

After this incident, a meeting was conducted between the two heads of the fraternity through the intercession of the Student Council.  The Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity was asking for an apology.  “Kailangan ng apology” in the words of respondent Aguilar.  But no apology was made.

On March 25, 1995, Ten minutes before his next class at 6:00 p.m.,   James Yap went out of the campus using the Engineering Gate to buy candies across Taft Avenue.  As he was about to re-cross Taft Avenue, he heard heavy footsteps at his back.  Eight to ten guys were running towards him.  He panicked.  He did not know what to do.  Then, respondent Bungubung punched him in the head with something heavy in his hands – “parangknuckles.”  Respondents Reverente and Lee were behind Yap, punching him.  Respondents Bungubung and Valdes who were in front of him, were also punching him.  As he was lying on the street, respondent Aguilar kicked him.  People shouted; guards arrived; and the group of attackers left. Yap could not recognize the other members of the group who attacked him.  With respect to respondent Papio, Mr. Yap said “hindi ko nakita ang mukha niya, hindi ko nakita sumuntok siya.”  What Mr. Yap saw was a long haired guy also running with the group.

The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war.  The victims, namely: petitioner James Yap and Dennis Pascual, Ericson Cano, and Michael Perez, are members of the “Domino Lux Fraternity,” while the alleged assailants, private respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of “Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity,” a rival fraternity.

The next day, March 30, 1995, petitioner Yap lodged a complaint[2][7] with the Discipline Board of DLSU charging private respondents with “direct assault.”  Similar complaints[3][8]were also filed by Dennis Pascual and Ericson Cano against Alvin Lee and private respondents Valdes and Reverente.  Thus, cases entitled “De La Salle University and College of St. Benilde v. Alvin Aguilar (AB-BSM/9152105), James Paul Bungubung (AB-PSM/9234403), Robert R. Valdes, Jr. (BS-BS-APM/9235086), Alvin Lee (EDD/9462325), Richard Reverente (AB-MGT/9153837) and Malvin A. Papio (AB-MGT/9251227)” were docketed as Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.

The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent separate notices to private respondents Aguilar, Bungubung and Valdes, Jr. and Reverente informing them of the complaints and requiring them to answer. Private respondents filed their respective answers.[4][9]

Said notices  issued by De La Salle Discipline Board uniformly stated as follows:

Please be informed that a joint and expanded Discipline Board had been constituted to hear and deliberate the charge against you for violation of CHED Order No. 4 arising from the written complaints of James Yap, Dennis C. Pascual, and Ericson Y. Cano.

You are directed to appear at the hearing of the Board scheduled on April 19, 1995 at 9:00 a.m. at the Bro. Connon Hall for you and your witnesses to give testimony and present evidence in your behalf.  You may be assisted by a lawyer when you give your testimony or those of your witnesses.

On or before April 18, 1995, you are further directed to provide the Board, through the Discipline Office, with a list of your witnesses as well as the sworn statement of their proposed testimony.

Your failure to appear at the scheduled hearing or your failure to submit the list of witnesses and the sworn statement of their proposed testimony will be considered a waiver on your part to present evidence and as an admission of the principal act complained of.

For your strict compliance.[5][13]

During the proceedings before the Board on April 19 and 28, 1995, private respondents interposed the common defense of alibi.

On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a Resolution[6][18] finding private respondents guilty.  They were meted the supreme penalty of automatic expulsion,[7][19] pursuant to CHED Order No. 4.[8][20]  The dispositive part of the resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, the Board finds respondents ALVIN AGUILAR (AB-BSM/9152105), JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG (AB-PSM/9234403), ALVIN LEE (EDD/94623250) and RICHARD V. REVERENTE (AB-MGT/9153837) guilty of having violated CHED Order No. 4 and thereby orders their automatic expulsion.

In the case of respondent MALVIN A. PAPIO (AB-MGT/9251227), the Board acquits him of the charge.

SO ORDERED.[9][21]

Private respondents separately moved for reconsideration[10][22] before the Office of the Senior Vice-President for Internal Operations of DLSU.  The motions were all denied in a Letter-Resolution[11][23] dated June 1, 1995.

On June 5, 1995, private respondent Aguilar filed with the RTC, Manila, against petitioners a petition for certiorari and injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.  It was docketed as Civil Case No. 95-74122 and assigned to respondent Judge of Branch 36.  The petition essentially sought to annul the May 3, 1995 Resolution of the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board and the June 1, 1995 Letter-Resolution of the Office of the Senior Vice-President for Internal Affairs.

The following day, June 6, 1995, respondent Judge issued a TRO[12][24] directing DLSU, its subordinates, agents, representatives and/or other persons acting for and in its behalf to refrain and desist from implementing Resolution dated May 3, 1995 and Letter-Resolution dated June 1, 1995 and to immediately desist from barring the enrollment of Aguilar for the second term of school year (SY) 1995.

On June 7, 1995, the CHED directed DLSU to furnish it with copies of the case records of Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121,[13][28] in view of the authority granted to it under Section 77(c) of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (MRPS).

On the other hand, private respondents Bungubung and Reverente, and later, Valdes, filed petitions-in-intervention[14][29] in Civil Case No. 95-74122.  Respondent Judge also issued corresponding temporary restraining orders to compel petitioner DLSU to admit said private respondents.

On June 19, 1995, petitioner Sales filed a motion to dismiss[15][30] in behalf of all petitioners, except James Yap.  On June 20, 1995, petitioners filed a supplemental motion to dismiss[16][31] the petitions-in-intervention.

On September 20, 1995, respondent Judge issued an Order[17][32] denying petitioners’ (respondents there) motion to dismiss and its supplement, and granted private respondents’ (petitioners there) prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.

Despite the said order, private respondent Aguilar was refused enrollment by petitioner DLSU when he attempted to enroll on September 22, 1995 for the second term of SY 1995-1996.  Thus, on September 25, 1995, Aguilar filed with respondent Judge an urgent motion to cite petitioners (respondents there) in contempt of court.[18][34]  Aguilar also prayed that petitioners be compelled to enroll him at DLSU in accordance with respondent Judge’s Order dated September 20, 1995.  On September 25, 1995, respondent Judge issued[19][35] a writ of preliminary injunction, ordering d\De La Salle not to implement its decision expelling private respondents. On October 16, 1995, petitioner DLSU filed with the CA a petition forcertiorari[20][37] (CA-G.R. SP No. 38719) with prayer for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of respondent Judge’s September 20, 1995 Order and writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995.

On April 12, 1996, the CA granted petitioners’ prayer for preliminary injunction.

On May 14, 1996, the CHED issued its questioned Resolution No. 181-96, summarily disapproving the penalty of expulsion for all private respondents.  As for Aguilar, he was to be reinstated, while other private respondents were to be excluded.[21][38]  The Resolution states:

RESOLUTION 181-96

RESOLVED THAT THE REQUEST OF THE DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY (DLSU), TAFT AVENUE, MANILA FOR THE APPROVAL OF THE PENALTY OF EXPULSION IMPOSED ON MR. ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, ROBERT R. VALDES, JR., ALVIN LEE AND RICHARD V. REVERENTE BE, AS IT IS HEREBY IS, DISAPPROVED.

RESOLVED FURTHER, THAT THE COMMISSION DIRECT THE DLSU TO IMMEDIATELY EFFECT THE REINSTATEMENT OF MR. AGUILAR AND THE LOWERING OF THE PENALTY OF MR. JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, MR. ROBER R. VALDEZ, JR., (sic) MR. ALVIN LEE AND MR. RICHARD V. REVERENTE FROM EXPULSION TO EXCLUSION.[22][39]

Despite the directive of CHED, petitioner DLSU again prevented private respondent Aguilar from enrolling and/or attending his classes, prompting his lawyer to write several demand letters[23][40] to petitioner DLSU.  In view of the refusal of petitioner DLSU to enroll private respondent Aguilar, CHED wrote a letter dated June 26, 1996 addressed to petitioner Quebengco requesting that private respondent Aguilar be allowed to continue attending his classes pending the resolution of its motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. 181-96.  However, petitioner Quebengco refused to do so, prompting CHED to promulgate an Order dated September 23, 1996 which states:

Acting on the above-mentioned request of Mr. Aguilar through counsel enjoining De La Salle University (DLSU) to comply with CHED Resolution 181-96 (Re: Expulsion Case of Alvin Aguilar, et al. v. DLSU) directing DLSU to reinstate Mr. Aguilar and finding the urgent request as meritorious, there being no other plain and speedy remedy available, considering the set deadline for enrollment this current TRIMESTER, and in order to prevent further prejudice to his rights as a student of the institution, DLSU, through the proper school authorities, is hereby directed to allow Mr. Alvin Aguilar to provisionally enroll, pending the Commission’s Resolution of the instant Motion for Reconsideration filed by DLSU.

Notwithstanding the said directive, petitioner DLSU, through petitioner Quebengco, still refused to allow private respondent Aguilar to enroll.  Thus, private respondent Aguilar’s counsel wrote another demand letter to petitioner DLSU.[24][42]

Meanwhile, on June 3, 1996, private respondent Aguilar, using CHED Resolution No. 181-96, filed a motion to dismiss[25][43] in the CA, arguing that CHED Resolution No. 181-96 rendered the CA case moot and academic.

On July 30, 1996, the CA issued its questioned resolution granting the motion to dismiss of private respondent Aguilar.

On October 28, 1996, petitioners requested transfer of case records to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) from the CHED.[26][46]  Petitioners claimed that it is the DECS, not CHED, which has jurisdiction over expulsion cases, thus, necessitating the transfer of the case records of Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121 to the DECS.

On November 4, 1996, in view of the dismissal of the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 38719 and the automatic lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction, private respondent Aguilar filed an urgent motion to reiterate writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 before respondent RTC Judge of Manila.[27][47]

On January 7, 1997, respondent Judge issued its questioned order granting private respondent Aguilar’s urgent motion to reiterate preliminary injunction.  The pertinent portion of the order reads:

In light of the foregoing, petitioner Aguilar’s urgent motion to reiterate writ of preliminary injunction is hereby granted, and respondents’ motion to dismiss is denied.

The writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 is declared to be in force and effect.

Hence, this case.

I  S S U E S:

Can petitioner DLSU invoke its right to academic freedom in support of its decision to expel the private respondents?

H E L D:

Since De La Salle University is an institution of higher learning, it enjoys academic freedom which includes the right to determine whom to admit as its students.

Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all institutions of higher learning academic freedom.  This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public interest calls for some restraint.[28][74] According to present jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the independence of an academic institution to determine for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study.[29][75]

While La Salle is entitled to invoke academic freedom in its actions against its students, the penalty of expulsion imposed by DLSU on private respondents is disproportionate to their misdeed.

It is true that schools have the power to instill discipline in their students as subsumed in their academic freedom and that “the establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival.”[30][94]  This power, however, does not give them the untrammeled discretion to impose a penalty which is not commensurate with the gravity of the misdeed.  If the concept of proportionality between the offense committed and the sanction imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes.  That would give rise to a due process question.[31][95]

We agree with respondent CHED that under the circumstances, the penalty of expulsion is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the acts committed by private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr.  Each of the two mauling incidents lasted only for few seconds and the victims did not suffer any serious injury.  Disciplinary measures especially where they involve suspension, dismissal or expulsion, cut significantly into the future of a student.  They attach to him for life and become a mortgage of his future, hardly redeemable in certain cases.  Officials of colleges and universities must be anxious to protect it, conscious of the fact that, appropriately construed, a disciplinary action should be treated as an educational tool rather than a punitive measure.[32][96]

Accordingly, petitioner DLSU may exclude or drop the names of the said private respondents from its rolls for being undesirable, and transfer credentials immediately issued, not EXPEL.

Read:

1.THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS, February 9, 1993

1-a. THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON.              RUBEN AYSON, August 17, 1989

1-c. UP BOARD OF REGENTS VS.  CA, August 31, 1999

Academic Freedom includes the power of a University to REVOKE a degree or honor it has conferred to a student after it was found out that the student’s graduation was obtained through fraud.

Academic freedom is given a wide sphere of authority. If an institution of higher learning can decide on who can and cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates.

Academic Freedom—

It is an atmosphere in which there prevail the four essential freedom of a university to determine for itself on academic grounds

a.            who may teach,

b.             what may be taught,

c.            how it shall be taught, and

d.           who may be admitted to study”‘ (Emphasis supplied; citing Sinco, Philippine Political Law, 491, (1962) and the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Sweezy v. New Hampshire (354 US 234 [1957]).

1-b)   GARCIA VS. FACULTY ADMISSION, 68 SCRA 277

“What is academic freedom? Briefly put, it is the freedom of professionally qualified persons to inquire, discover, publish and teach the truth as they see it in the field of their competence. It is subject to no control or authority except the control or authority of the rational methods by which truths or conclusions are sought and established in these disciplines.”

“The personal aspect of freedom consists in the right of each university teacher  recognized and effectively guaranteed by society  to seek and express the truth as he personally sees it, both in his academic work and in his capacity as a private citizen. Thus the status of the individual university teacher is at least as important, in considering academic freedom, as the status of the institutions to which they belong and through which they disseminate their learning.”‘

          2)   MONTEMAYOR VS. ARANETA UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION

          3)   VILLAR VS. TIP, April 17, 1985

          4)   MALABANAN VS. RAMENTO,129 SCRA 359

          5)   BELENA VS. PMI

          6)   ALCUAZ VS. PSBA, May 2, 1988

               6-a) ALCUAZ VS. PSBA, September 29, 1989                                        (Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration) Read also the dissenting opinion of Justice Sarmiento

          7)   TONGONAN VS. PANO, 137 SCRA 246

          8)   ATENEO VS. CA, 145 SCRA 100

          9)   GUZMAN VS. NU, 142 SCRA 706

         10)   ANGELES VS. SISON, 112 SCRA 26

              11. Tan vs. CA, 199 SCRA 212

         12. Colegio del Sto. Nino vs. NLRC, 197 SCRA 611

         13. Dean Reyes vs. CA,

         14. UP vs. CA, February  9, 1993

         15. Ateneo vs. Judge Capulong, May 27, 1993

 

Reference:

Political Law Reviewer by Atty. Larry D. Gacayan

College of Law, University of the Cordilleras

Baguio City

[1][1]  College of Saint Benilde is an educational institution which is part of the De La Salle System.

[2][7]  Id. at 127.

[3][8]  Id. at 128-129.

[4][9]  Id. at 130-133.

[5][13] Id. at 134.

[6][18] Id. at 139-150.

[7][19] Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (1992), Sec. 77(c) provides that expulsionis “an extreme penalty of an erring pupil or student consisting of his exclusion from admission to any public or private school in the Philippines and which requires the prior approval of the Secretary.  The penalty may be imposed for acts or offenses constituting gross misconduct, dishonesty, hazing, carrying deadly weapons, immorality, selling and/or possession of prohibited drugs such as marijuana, drug dependency, drunkenness, hooliganism, vandalism, and other serious school offenses such as assaulting a pupil or student or school personnel, instigating or leading illegal strikes or similar concerned activities resulting in the stoppage of classes, preventing or threatening any pupil or student or school personnel from entering the school premises or attending classes or discharging their duties, forging or tampering with school records or school forms, and securing or using forged school records, forms and documents.”

[8][20] Rollo, pp. 151-153.

[9][21] Id. at 150.

[10][22] Id. at 1284-1304.

[11][23] Id. at 172-178.

[12][24] Id. at 180.

[13][28] Id. at 208.

[14][29] Id. at 210-236.

[15][30] Id. at 237-246.

[16][31] Id. at 247-275.

[17][32] Id. at 1116-1124.

[18][34] Id. at 1563-1571.

[19][35] Id. at 114-115.

[20][37] Id. at 336-392.

[21][38] Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (1992), Sec. 77(b) provides thatexclusion is “a penalty in which the school is allowed to exclude or drop the name of the erring pupil or student from the school rolls for being undesirable, and transfer credentials immediately issued.”

[22][39] Rollo, pp. 125-126.

[23][40] Id. at 1599-1606.

[24][42] Id. at 1605-1606.

[25][43] Id. at 435-438.

[26][46] Id. at 518-522.

[27][47] Id. at 523-530.

[28][74] Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 401 Phil. 431, 455-456 (2000), citing Tangonan v. Paño, G.R. No. L-45157, June 27, 1985, 137 SCRA 245, 256-257.

[29][75] Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology, G.R. No. 156109, November 18, 2004, 443 SCRA 56. The “four essential freedoms of a university” were formulated by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter of the United States Supreme Court in his concurring opinion in the leading case of Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 US 234, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1311, 77 S. Ct. 1203.

[30][94] See note 87, at 663-664.

[31][95] Malabanan v. Ramento, 214 Phil. 319, 330 (1984).

[32][96] Rollo, p. 515.

Political Law Part XI: Article XI – Accountability of Public Officers

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Political Law Part XI: Article XI – Accountability of Public Officers

POLITICAL LAW PART XI

 ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

 1.  Sections 1. Public Office is a public trust.

  CAMILO L. SABIO vs. GORDON, G.R. No. 174340,  October 17, 2006, 504 SCRA 704

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

The Facts:

On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455),[1][4] “directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC),  Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors.”

On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff  Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of Senator Richard J. Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG, one of the herein petitioners, inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services.  The purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455.[2][6]

On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment.[3][7]At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of           E.O. No. 1.

I S S U E:

Crucial to the resolution of the present petitions is the fundamental issue of whetherSection 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is repealed by the 1987 Constitution.  Assuming that it has not been repealed, is it not inconsistent with Section 1, Art. XI which states that public office is a public trust?

The petition has no merit.

Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits the  power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding, thus:

No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.

Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI,     Section 1 of the Constitution stating that: “Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.”

The provision presupposes that since an incumbent of a public office is invested with certain powers and charged with certain duties pertinent to sovereignty, the powers so delegated to the officer are held in trust for the people and are to be exercised in behalf of the government or of all citizens who may need the intervention of the officers. Such trust extends to all matters within the range of duties pertaining to the office. In other words, public officers are but the servants of the people, and not their rulers.[4][24] 

Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the principle of public accountability.   It places the PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of courts, Congress and other administrative bodies.  Instead of encouraging public accountability, the same provision only institutionalizes irresponsibility and non-accountability.  InPresidential Commission on Good Government v. Peña,[5][25] Justice Florentino P. Feliciano characterized as “obiter” the portion of the majority opinion barring, on the basis of Sections 4(a) and (b) of E.O. No. 1, a civil case for damages filed against the PCGG and its Commissioners. He eloquently opined:

The above underscored portions are, it is respectfully submitted, clearly obiter. It is important to make clear that the Court is not here interpreting, much less upholding as valid and constitutional, the literal terms of Section 4 (a), (b) of Executive Order No.1.If Section 4 (a) were given its literal import as immunizing the PCGG or any member thereof from civil liability “for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this Order,” the constitutionality of Section 4 (a) would, in my submission, be open to most serious doubt. For so viewed, Section 4 (a) would institutionalize the irresponsibility and non-accountability of members and staff of the PCGG, a notion that is clearly repugnant to both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution and a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic under the 1987 Constitution. x  x  x.

It would seem constitutionally offensive to suppose that a member or staff member of the PCGG could not be required to testify before the Sandiganbayan or that such members were exempted from complying with orders of this Court.    

Chavez v. Sandiganbayan[6][26] reiterates the same view.  Indeed, Section 4(b) has been frowned upon by this Court even before the filing of the present petitions.

2. Sections 12–18

a.   Impeachment, officers of the government who are impeachable, grounds, limitations for its exercise, procedure, etc. . .

 ROMULO, et al vs. YNIGUEZ, et al, 141 SCRA 263

“Culpable violation of the constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust”

Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any other office under the Republic of the Philippines but shall nevertheless be liable to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law.

Read:

FRANCISCO VS. SPEAKER JOSE DE VENECIA, ET AL, 415 SCRA 44, November 10,  2003

When is an impeachment complaint deemed to be a bar to the filing of another complaint within a 1-year period?

A verified impeachment complaint bars the filing of another complaint against   an impeachable official  within a period of 1 year after the same was received by the House of Representatives and referred by the Speaker to the appropriate committee for its study and recommendation. It is deemed initiated under Art. XI, Section 3 [5] after the referral to the Committee by the Speaker. To “initiate” refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint COUPLED WITH CONGRESS TAKING INITIAL ACTION OF SAID COMPLAINT.”

a-1. Degree of loyalty, etc. of government employee.

Read:

Lim-Arce vs. Arce, 205 SCRA 21

b.   The SANDIGANBAYAN AND TANODBAYAN DECREES

Read:

1)   PD’s 1486, 1847, 1606, 1607 and 1630

2)   Exec. Order 244

3)   NUNEZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 111 SCRA 433

          4)   MANGUBAT VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 147 SCRA 478

          5)   GABISON VS. DE LOS ANGELES, 151 SCRA 61

          6)  ZALDEVAR  VS. RAUL GONZALES, April 27,                1988 and the Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration dated 19 May 1988

          6)   BAGASO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 155 SCRA 154

          7)   DE JESUS VS. PEOPLE, 120 SCRA 760

          8)   QUIMPO VS. TANODBAYAN, December 2, 1986, 146 SCRA

          9)   INTING VS. TANODBAYAN, 97 SCRA 494

b-1 Who prosecutes public officials? Exception

Read:

1. Corpuz vs.  Tanodbayan, 149 SCRA 281

c.   Disqualification of public officer

Read:

1)   MINOR VS. AGBU, April 10, 1987

          2)   MAHARLIKA PUBLISHING VS. TAGLE, 142 SCRA 553

D. Power of the Ombudsman to suspend public officials.

Read:

Buenaseda vs. Flavier, September 21, 1993

More Articles ...

  1. ARTICLE X – LOCAL GOVERNMENT
  2. Political Law Part IX: Article IX – Constitutional Commissions
  3. Political Law Part VIII: Article VIII – The Judicial Department
  4. Political Law Part VII: Article VII – The Executive Department